Victor Davis Hanson in his The Father of Us All; War & History, Ancient & Modern gives due credit to The Age of Battles as one of the finest examples of military history as indeed it is. Since it was first published in 1991, Weigley gives a continual history of warfare, mostly in Western Europe, from Breitenfeld to Waterloo. Starting with the revolutionary tactics of Gustavus Adolphus and ending with the defeat of Napoleon, the author traces the continual quest for the “decisive battle” as a short cut to victory.

After the terrible bloodbath of the Thirty Years War, which left Germany devastated with millions of dead, it seemed as if Europe had made a conscious decision that warfare had to be restructured. One of the key steps to this process was Hugonis Grotius, the historical rules for the limitation of war were formalized. These rules were loosely going back to the rules of chivalry (which were never terribly effective) covered dealing with civilians, plunder, and more. Many rulers in Europe recognized that while war was not going to disappear, they could at least try to limit the overall damage. It was amazing that with the rise of nation states and greater concentration of power and wealth, those who ruled suddenly realized that they had a personal stake in limiting wars which could be dangerous to their position and existence.

The military revolution went hand in hand with the greater solidification of centralized power. Gustavus Adolphus the leader of a small and poor European state (Sweden) realized that he had to take his disadvantage and turn it into a positive. The result was a small, highly trained, well disciplined, well fed and amazingly for the time, one that was paid on time. The result was an outstanding force of cavalry (changed and trained on Sweden’s wartime experiences in Poland) backed by a solid infantry trained on shock tactics. For example, the traditional cavalry tactic with the introduction of pistols was for the cavalry to charge the enemy, then stop and fire a volley and retreat. The effect as normally poor, as attempting to accurately wield a primitive pistol which was not only inaccurate but of small penetrating power hardly seemed worth the effort. Adolphus remembering the shock impact of the heavy Polish cavalry trained his cavalry to smash into the enemy formations, break then and then allow the infantry to finish the battle. For a while, he was the terror of Europe, but he ran into problems which he had not foreseen, such as the rise of the centralized state (or other kingdoms) which were larger and wealthier.

Therein lay the rub; how could a general win a war by scoring a decisive battle when the enemy was able how to tap into its own military advantages, such as manpower and wealth. Famously, Louis XIV restructured his system of taxation, developed a competent bureaucracy, and hired some of the best officers in Europe. The result was a dramatic increase in the size of the French military and in the professionalism of the military. Standard uniforms, drills, command structures, etc. all went to create a military that began to move like a machine instead of a mob. In particular, the French army the innovations in artillery made many of the old defensive infantry tactics an invitation to slaughter. Finally, instead of an army numbering ten or fifteen thousand, the French army expanded to number hundreds of thousands. How was a small state like Sweden to compete with power like that?

Unlike many military historians, the author manages to blend the personalities, goals and most importantly, innovations which led to each leader or generals’ temporary success on the battlefield. He also shows how the development of a professional military sped up the development of the industries necessary for it’s being.

He ends the book with the battle of Waterloo, where Napoleon, short of cavalry, surrounded by generals who were past their prime (as was he), head of an army from a nation which had already suffered a million dead from his reign was defeated by an polyglot army made up of, for the most part, traditionally second rate infantry but held together by Wellington who had nothing but distain for the average soldier. Although future generals and admirals would dream of a “decisive battle,” the time for any chance of such a battle has long passed. The modern state is too diverse with too many resources to disappear due to one loss, no matter how great. We have seen during the twentieth century how far the state will go and how much of its population it will sacrifice to survive.

This is the third time I have read the book and each time I have found the book stimulating and a reminder of the skills needed by successful leaders not only in the military, but in business or any endeavor where much is at stake. The ability to adapt and innovate is the one constant lesson to be learned from this work.

Siberia after it was conquered by the Russian Empire, was consider a land of huge wealth, from the priceless furs (a single Ermine pelt was enough to buy a good farm in Russia) to timber and gold, it was also known as the world’s largest prison without a roof.  A land where landless free peasants to go to in order to escape the tyranny of the Tsars and to build a new life, it also served as a great dumping ground for all manner of criminals, both political and non-political (one could be sent to Siberia for life long exile for being a vagrant).  As the population of Russia grew, and the central government could not provide the services for the population, Siberia became a way for lazy local officials to get rid of those they considered problematic.

The journey to Siberia until the advent of the Trans-Siberian railway was most on foot.  Imagine walking, 6 days out of 7, week in, week out, in the Siberian summer and winter for one to two years just to reach your place of exile.  And, your term of punishment did not begin until you completed that journey.  During that journey you were, unless supported by your family who could provide you funds, at the mercy and budget of the prison system which provided a minimum of food and clothing both during the trek and at your place of exile.  The system was so terrible, that some male prisoners would often write their wives telling them to sell everything and come to Siberia where the government was providing each prisoner with land, a cow, horse, house and funds.  In reality, nothing was provided and when the wife arrived with children in hand, their husbands would sell them all into prostitution in order to get enough money to live.

After the term of punishment was completed, as the theory went, the ex-prisoners who had been taught discipline and hard work, would stay in Siberia and begin new farms which would colonize the vast land.  In reality, the prisoners had been so brutalized by the guards, other prisoners and hard labor, that they turned to the only things they had really learned in exile; stealing, forgery, murder, etc.  The large numbers of former prisoners would often wander in bands, laying siege to individual farms and even smaller villages and towns.

If there is one consistent image that has come out of the Civil War, it has been of Robert E. Lee, the calm, brilliant strategist who fought for the Confederacy out of a sense of loyalty to his state of Virginia; a soft spoken man, opposed to slavery but believing more in State’s Rights and the honor of the South.

Many of these myths are exploded in this book as Nolan quotes from Lee’s pre-war letters regarding the institution of slavery; how the slaves were well looked after, how they were better off in their present condition than when they were in Africa as they had the opportunity, at some undisclosed date, to become better than they were (although they could not be as good as whites).  Yes, Lee admitted that there were abuses, but they were few and sometimes necessary to keep the blacks in check until that golden day in the future where they could move up the human food chain. 

Nolan also criticizes Lee as a general in that he failed to fully understand until too late the overwhelmingly destructive firepower of “modern” rifles and artillery.  A prime example of this could be seen at Gettysburg where Lee ignored the strategy put forth by General Longstreet to hit the U.S. army on its flanks.  Instead, Lee threw the fresh troops of Pickett into an assault on the center of the Union line with no reserves at hand so that even if Pickett’s troops had been successful, they would have been swamped by Meade bringing up reserves from both of his wings.  Lee believed in the power to the spirit and was certainly not the last General to fall prey to the idea; the French army in the beginning of World War I was another force that failed to comprehend the full implications of “modern” technology. 

After the Civil War, Lee held an honored place in the minds of most Southerners, even though he admitted that he realized after Gettysburg that the South could not win the conflict.  He fought on and kept his troop together in a cause that was lost against a foe that was more ruthless than he could be in the conduct of the war.  The hundreds of thousands who died after his realization must be in part, laid at his feet but the myth of Lee will not be laid to rest until sometime in the future.

A good book for the reader who is unfamiliar with revisionist history, but a revisionist history that has much merit.

Much of the history of Japan lives withing a cloud of myth and legend along with a masterful manipulation of reality. This is especially true since the Meiji restoration whn the emperor was taken as the new central figure in Japan.  Suddenly the Emperor, who had traditionally had no power and was controlled by the Shogun was presented figuratively to the population as divine and the central focus of Japanese life.  Yet, the Emperor himself lived in a closed world or court etiquette and political intrigue.

This excellent history tells the story of who was the power behind the throne and of the vast scale of looting conducted by the Japanese during World War II.  Within Imperial Japan, there was a cadre of powerful families, former samurai war lords who controlled the military and the zaibatsu and thus the economy.  By controlling the military and the economy, they were able to work hand in hand with each other to gather enormous riches and unquestioned power, all while creating a cult around a compliant Emperor.

During World War II, an Italian Senator who was forced to resign his post by Mussolini. This was the man who in 1925 published his three-volume work on the causes of the First World War.  At 2280 pages, Senator Albertini provides the serious student of history with a detailed, inside glimpse at European power politics reaching back into the mid 19^th century.  In these volumes he exposes to the light of day the most minute diplomatic dispatches as well as his own personal discussions with many of the diplomats who had key roles in the lead up to the First World War. 

Reading diplomatic dispatches, letters and notes is never fascinating in the best of times, and with the distance of time, it is often difficult to remember or place correctly the individual players.  German Foreign Ministers of the Kaiser come and go; diplomats of the Czar long forgotten are suddenly brought back to light and the internal wrangling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire between the pro-German factions and the landed Magyars who are at direct logger heads with the Austrian Foreign office can be mind numbing. Added to the pile of information are the even more obscure Italian officials who want so badly to be taken seriously by the “great” European powers and are generally scorned, mistrusted and pushed aside and you have a web of intrigue that is difficult to follow without copious notes or a mind trained to a unusually high level of boredom.

            Yet the volumes can also at times read like a great mystery tale, but one in which you know the outcome and which, at times, you want at times to reach back in time to throttle, berate and besiege the players so that the terrible bloody outcome can somehow be avoided. At times you begin to see the engine of history moving forward, picking up speed and moving in what seems to be an unstoppable manner to the conclusion which chewed up the lives, future, and fortune of so many tens of millions of individuals.  At times you must put the book down as you shake your head with the knowledge of future events which seem so clear nearly a hundred years later, but which were so shrouded at the time.  The book can be infuriating and at times you hope there is a God with a sense of Justice, with a capital “J”.  You hope there truly is a day of reckoning for so many individuals, such as:

The Russian army has had moments of brilliance, such as the defeat of Napoleon and the logistical miracle of following him from Moscow to Paris. There is no doubt that the army which was responsible for ninety percent of German losses in WWII (thanks in large part to the supplies provided by the U.S. and the U.K. at no charge) played a key part in the defeat of Hitler.

Today however, we see a Russian army that sadly fits the stereotype in many people’s minds; poorly trained, led and equipped. Once again, without total mobilization, the Russian army is simply too small and poorly led for the job of defending its immense country.

Is the stereotype accurate when looking at the Russian army currently in the field? This book helps to put the challenges of that army in an historical context.

With the defeat during the Crimean War, the new Czar realized that his army while large, could not compete with those of other European nations.  Thus began, over the next 50 years, attempts to update the military skills of the officer corp., the weapons, training, etc. of the entire Imperial Army.  But serious questions arose and continued to rise as rapid changes in military technology raised doubts about long held beliefs and new theories of the military art.  Those same questions would worry the military minds of other European powers.  To give a couple of examples:

• The old theory was that the troops would line up for attack at 250 paces from the enemy, but with smokeless powder (hence a longer range), that distance began to expand to 500 paces, then 1000 and eventually over a kilometer and a half from the enemy forces.  This meant that the killing ground was expanded and what steps could be taken to minimize lives?
• Along with the infantry, direct fire artillery since the time of Napoleon had played a major part in any attack or defense.  But with the longer range of infantry weapons, the artillerist was more open to withering fire so new tactics such as indirect fire had to be worked out.

Many officers had theories to answer these and other questions, but at the same time there were vested interests which refused to acknowledge these and many other problems.  Top generals, who fought during the Napoleonic wars still believed in the shock value of cavalry, and their influence ate up huge sums of the military budget.

Financial concerns were also a top priority.  Training was often poor, especially further away from St. Petersburg and due to tight budgets, for example, the artillery was limited to only two rounds of certain types of ammunitions per gun per year!  Bullets were expensive so large rattles were used to imitate the sound of machine guns firing. 

And yet, despite the stereotype of the dark plodding masses, gradually the army learned and moved on; allowances for more initiative at the lower levels was encouraged and a Staff school was set up to create a more professional officer class.  A major problem however, was that seniority still ruled and the more professional staff officers were cut off from reaching the highest levels.

The book covers not only the areas above, but a basic description of the war with Turkey (1877-78) and Japan (1904-05) to the eve of WWI.  It does not go into the financial arrangements with France which lead to much of Russia’s fail development prior to the war (all of which was aimed at moving the Russian army faster against Germany), but does give some detail on the under estimation of the Russian army as to the amount of munitions needed for modern war (despite the experience of the war with Japan), but then so did most of the other European nations.

An interesting book for the military historian, but it can be dry and academic.  I would like to see similar books on the German and French armies during the same time.op

iance, such as the defeat of Napoleon including it logistical excellence in its ability to follow him all the way to Paris. There is no doubt that it won the Second World War by inflicting ninety percent of the German casualities (helped in large part by the supplies provided at no cost by the U.S. Yet currently, we see a Russian army that fits the

With the defeat during the Crimean War, the new Czar realized that his army while large, could not compete with those of other European nations.  Thus began, over the next 50 years, attempts to update the military skills of the officer corp., the weapons, training, etc. of the entire Imperial Army.  But serious questions arose and continued to rise as rapid changes in military technology raised doubts about long held beliefs and new theories of the military art.  Those same questions would worry the military minds of other European powers.  To give a couple of examples:

• The old theory was that the troops would line up for attack at 250 paces from the enemy, but with smokeless powder (hence a longer range), that distance began to expand to 500 paces, then 1000 and eventually over a kilometer and a half from the enemy forces.  This meant that the killing ground was expanded and what steps could be taken to minimize lives?
• Along with the infantry, direct fire artillery since the time of Napoleon had played a major part in any attack or defense.  But with the longer range of infantry weapons, the artillerist was more open to withering fire so new tactics such as indirect fire had to be worked out.

Many officers had theories to answer these and other questions, but at the same time there were vested interests which refused to acknowledge these and many other problems.  Top generals, who fought during the Napoleonic wars still believed in the shock value of cavalry, and their influence ate up huge sums of the military budget.

Financial concerns were also a top priority.  Training was often poor, especially further away from St. Petersburg and due to tight budgets, for example, the artillery was limited to only two rounds of certain types of ammunitions per gun per year!  Bullets were expensive so large rattles were used to imitate the sound of machine guns firing. 

And yet, despite the stereotype of the dark plodding masses, gradually the army learned and moved on; allowances for more initiative at the lower levels was encouraged and a Staff school was set up to create a more professional officer class.  A major problem however, was that seniority still ruled and the more professional staff officers were cut off from reaching the highest levels.

The book covers not only the areas above, but a basic description of the war with Turkey (1877-78) and Japan (1904-05) to the eve of WWI.  It does not go into the financial arrangements with France which lead to much of Russia’s fail development prior to the war (all of which was aimed at moving the Russian army faster against Germany), but does give some detail on the under estimation of the Russian army as to the amount of munitions needed for modern war (despite the experience of the war with Japan), but then so did most of the other European nations.

An interesting book for the military historian, but it can be dry and academic.  I would like to see similar books on the German and French armies during the same time.

Re-reading Barbara Tuchman’s The March of Folly from Troy to Vietnam (originally published in 1984) and reviewing the foolish foreign policy decisions around the world since then, seems to give proof to the statement by John Adams that government, “is little better practiced now than three or four thousand years ago.”  Policy makers seem to delight in flying in the face of common sense, logic, and facts in pursuit of their policies. A wiser man than most, Jordan Peterson once said that when he makes a major decision, he does not look at the best possible outcome, but the downside cost if he is wrong. Too bad that statement is not hammered onto the desktop of every government policy wonk as a warning against their hopes and dreams.

In her book, Tuchman studies the times, forces and choices made by the Greeks who were given a horse, the Renaissance Popes, the British lost of the colonies and American leaders regarding our experience in Viet Nam. Of course, trying to separate fact from fable in the story of Troy is the most difficult, in part because the very ideas that a hollow wooden horse filled with one’s enemies willingly being brought into the city of Troy defies logic. Yet Tuchman does an excellent job of examining the tales from several sides and trying to understand how the leaders of Troy ignored legends, omens, and warnings. The result is well known and should serve as a warning against acting on the basis on ego and hubris.

Victor Davis Hanson in his The Father of Us All; War & History, Ancient & Modern gives due credit to The Age of Battles as one of the finest examples of military history as indeed it is. Since it was first published in 1991, Weigley gives a continual history of warfare, mostly in Western Europe, from Breitenfeld to Waterloo. Starting with the revolutionary tactics of Gustavus Adolphus and ending with the defeat of Napoleon, the author traces the continual quest for the “decisive battle” as a short cut to victory.

After the terrible bloodbath of the Thirty Years War, which left Germany devastated with millions of dead, it seemed as if Europe had made a conscious decision that warfare had to be restructured. One of the key steps to this process was Hugonis Grotius, the historical rules for the limitation of war were formalized. These rules were loosely going back to the rules of chivalry (which were never terribly effective) covered dealing with civilians, plunder, and more. Many rulers in Europe recognized that while war was not going to disappear, they could at least try to limit the overall damage. It was amazing that with the rise of nation states and greater concentration of power and wealth, those who ruled suddenly realized that they had a personal stake in limiting wars which could be dangerous to their position and existence.

One of the pleasant things about histories by Figes is that they are so readable. Like two of other histories of his I have read, (“The Whisperers” and “A People’s Tragedy”), Figes has the ability to bring the past alive and make you feel as if you are part of the action. He does not concentrate on battle scenes (although battles are covered), but he centers on the lives of the ordinary soldiers. In this book he gives short shift to Florence Nightingale but points out the breakthrough of a Russian surgeon, Dr. Nikolai Pirogov who used an early form of triage as well as anesthesia.

Despite the common view of the war, it was the French who supplied most of the troops, not the British and it was the French, not the British who better supplied their men with everything, from tents to food to warm coats for the cold Crimea winter, etc. Among the allied armies, approximately eighty percent of the deaths were due to disease, frostbite, etc.

It is also interesting to note that there were very real plans for a coalition whose goals was the breakup of the Russian Empire, including invasions of Russia from the Baltic, uprisings in Poland and an invasion from the Crimea into the area of Kiev. But as the causalities began to mount, the enthusiasm for such great plans began to wane and in the end a settlement was made.

For all the loss of blood and lives, Russia was able to regain her position within 25 years and continue to create problems in the Balkans. Her meddling and ambitions led to World War I thanks to a system that refused to believe that the world was changing and was all too often in the hands of a single man who could be unbelievably foolish.

A big book (about five hundred pages) but an interesting one which never goes off into tangents that do not serve to tell the main story. This is my third reading of these excellent history and each time I pick up some interesting tidbit in which historians (even amateurs such as myself) delight.

I am re-reading Orlando Figes’ (for the third time) excellent The Crimean War and I was struck by the plight of all the soldiers (particularity the British, Russian and Ottoman). The daily trials of poor food, lack of medical facilities, diseases, abuse from officers including whipping enlisted men can make the horrors of actual battle seem less terrible.

In this reading, I have come to realize that alone among armies in the West, the Russian army seems to have consistently been the worse abuser of its own men. From the time of Peter the Great, through the list of Czars, into the First World War, to today, the average Russian soldier has been seen as truly expendable and faceless. With that mindset, we have seen repeatedly the failure of the Russian Empire and today, the ability to field a successful fighting force against a lengthy list of enemies. Yes, the military was effective in WWII, but in face of the brutality of the German opponents and given the total ruthlessness of Stalin and his generals, the average Russian soldier had nothing to lose by throwing himself into the cauldron of war. Throughout history, the Russian soldier has been poorly led, poorly equipped, lacking in logistical support and abused by his own officers. Indeed, such a luxury as a graves unit was virtually unknown. During Czarist times, until WWI, returning soldiers were often not allowed to return to their own villages (to disguise the human losses). When peasants were drafted for the military, their send off was an actual funeral procession while in WWII, when a high Soviet officer was asked about the lack of care for the dead, he is reported to have said that if a man does not return home, it will be assumed he was killed in the war.

The following from Figes’ book captures the pity those soldiers at the time of the Crimean War earned. As Figes writes,