Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brede et de Montesquieu was from the middle of the 18th century through the founding of the United States, widely considered to be the preeminent political thinker of his time. His categorization of what constitutes a tyranny, an empire and a republic influenced our Founding Fathers in their debates and in the writing of the Federalist Papers. He was the principal architect of the theory of separation of powers and his main work, The Spirit of Law (1748) was well received throughout Europe and the thirteen colonies.

This work is considered a minor work, but I would like to suggest that no politician be allowed to take office until they have read and passed a test based on what he writes in this gem of a book.

Rome, like any organism or organization, had a period of growth followed by a decline. What were the causes of its growth? That is often asked as is, what caused its decline? Historians and others will argue those points for as long as Rome is remembered and everyone who attempts to answer those questions will be both correct and wrong. There were numerous causes but that in the end, as with other empires, the entire system simply imploded from lack of will, moral degeneracy and outside pressures that were simply more than could be managed given the resources available. Over time, the ideals and energy which helped the successful growth were lost and there were not enough good and strong men and women to hold the center together.

 Rome started as a small community, cut off from the sea, surrounded by numerous enemies, many of them larger. It had little natural wealth, barely any art and the citizens realized that the only way to enrich themselves was through pillage. Montesquieu believed that Rome’s power came from several factors, among them a constant drive for war, an unwillingness to accept defeat, an equal sharing of the plunder and a government which only allowed recognition and advancement through military success. Because Rome was always at war and because they adopted the best military practices of their individual neighbors, they simply excelled at war. They easily adopted the best skills of their military foes, such as cavalry, the Spanish short sword, etc. and use each in a way that helped to insure their victories. They developed a mindset which directed all activities of the State to be in the successful furtherance of war. Defeat was simply unacceptable and as was demonstrated during the war against Hannibal, no matter how often Roe’s field armies were defeated, they simply kept going after their nemesis until they achieved final victory. Such a mindset is not possible today as the technology of war simply makes war too expensive both in treasure and lives. So, what can we learn from the Romans? We can learn from them the reasons for their decline.

Elting, a noted historian and lecturer at West Point has put it all together in this 700+ page book.  He starts with a discussion of the decline of the French Army after King Louis XV and its destruction during the French Revolution.  He then proceeds to discuss every aspect of the Army, from the equipment, feeding, transportation, etc. of each branch of the Army, from the infantry to artillery, etc. 

An outstanding one volume history which ends with the new regime of King Louis XVIII, his mistrust of the Imperial army, his lack of skilled advisors, etc., and of course, the Hundred Days of Napoleon.  I would recommend that if you are going to read this book, that you keep handy “Napoleon’s Marshals” which was edited by David Chandler. This book discusses (each Marshal is covered by a different historian) the records of all of Napoleon’s Marshals (25 French, one Polish) including their skills, greed, loyalty (or lack thereof), etc. 

Another wonderful reference book to settle or at least provide fodder for any discussion of the subject (Napoleon’s campaigns, his personal skills, etc.).  The two books total about 1200 pages so don’t think you will finish them in a sitting, but they are well worth the effort.  If nothing else, as with so much of history, you learn a great deal about human nature and management.

Covering the period between 1450-1620, Hale brings into play all the forces around which everyday life evolved in Europe.  He traces the slow development of the roads, art, economics, religion, how the old warrior class took on new leadership roles and the slow gradual realization of national identities.  The concept of national identities could not have been achieved without the constant warfare of the age so while the time was often bloody for a small percentage of the overall population, the development of industries necessary for the wars themselves create economic opportunities and the build up of wider areas of cross trade.

Aside from the usual topics one would expect in a book like this, he also spends time looking at the daily lives of ordinary people and how they lived.   How did they dress, where did they shop, how were rules of civility created and enforced? What and how did a common language develop in any geographical area and how did that common language unite the people in becoming what we know as France or Germany, etc.  How were the average people able to live during the upheavals in Christianity which were driven not only by religious differences, but also by the various local rulers who saw the time as an opportunity to enrich themselves by pillaging monasteries, churches, etc. 

The book is not an especially easy read; not because it is not well written, for it is, but the amount of information available is extraordinary.  This is due not only to the usual method of using a wide brush, but also because he delves into the ordinary and discusses how movements, ideas, etc. could impact the people of Europe down to the poorest peasant.  It falls into the category of books that if one were ever asked to read one book on a subject, would the one recommended. 

When one thinks of Russia, the image of the Kremlin comes to mind.  In modern times (since 1917), the Kremlin has stood as the powerful image of a country which is difficult to grasp regarding its size, peoples and politics.  And, for most of history, the Kremlin has been used as the political seat of power in Russia.  Possession of this complex, which was built of wood for most of history and which has been destroyed by fire numerous times, has legitimized and symbolized the power of its owner.

Peter the Great moved his seat of government from Moscow to his new city on the sea (St. Petersburgh, then Petrograd, then Leningrad and finally St. Petersburgh) in order to start anew, away from the boyars (nobles) so he could make Russia look to the West.  The Bolsheviks moved the seat of power back to the Kremlin to show their break with the past and today the Kremlin remains the seat of Russian power, poised half way between the West and the East.  The Kremlin symbolizes the strength, stability and secret nature of the Russian state.

Burned, rebuilt, burned again and again, many treasures of the Kremlin have been lost, rebuilt and lost over the centuries.  Precious icons, jewels, rich gowns not to mention at times, the nations gold reserves were stored in the Kremlin.  Additionally, numerous churches and palaces of the closest noblemen were within it walls and all subject to the drives and whims of the Czar. It is as if Ft. Knox, the Library of Congress and the Smithsonian were all gathered together in a few square acres and closed to the public.  Then, time after time again the complex suffered from massive fires.

No one really knows the full extent of the secret rooms and tunnels within the compound. And, it represents an opportunity for miracles to the Russian people; a few years ago a sacred icon rumored to have been destroyed by the Bolsheviks were “found” as they had been secretly preserved by workers when they were sealed behind a false wall.  Although church attendance in Russia is falling, the “miraculous” recovery of the long-lost icon showed again the eternal strength and power of the Kremlin and its current “Czar” Vladimir Putin.

As depicted by Hollywood and popular culture, Casanova was a noted womanizer who had no conscience, made a habit of fleeing from irate husbands through second story bedroom windows and was always one step from receiving his just desserts.  Casanova was a major womanizer (although the number of his “conquests” pale in comparison with today’s rock, sport and Hollywood celebrities) but he was also much more, having successfully lived in the courts of Spain, France and even Russia; he conversed with Voltaire and assisted Mozart and his librettist Lorenzo Da Ponte on the composition of Don Giovanni.  Moving from country to country (he had been exiled from his native Venice), he lived by his wits, by gambling and late in life, by his writing. 

Some of his most amazing adventures (with and without women) occurred in Venice before his exile.  Venice at the time was still ruled by a clique of powerful families who were slowly dying out.  They controlled the morals, politics and fortunes of the city and despite their lessening physical strength, kept the Republic under a tight control by means of spies and strict moral guidelines.  The nobility, both men and women, when in public wore rigid white masks (often too in private) and Venetian laws specified severe punishments for those who violated the code.  Women’s masks were held in place with a button held between the front teeth (it was therefore called the “silent mask”).  In order to protect the “honor” of the younger women, they were placed in convents, but the girls found ways to slip away from the convents and cavort with their lovers such as Casanova even in the city.  They were able to do this as the guild which controlled the gondolas insured that all members were sworn to secrecy; that secrecy provided them a sure stream of passengers who had their trysts in the enclosed areas of the gondolas.  In fact, according to a French visitor, the “nuns (in the convents) are the most attractive among all the women in Venice…(and) their costume enhanced their good looks”.

Viewing the French Revolution, he realized that his world was being destroyed and in the last few years of his life he worked for eighteen hours a day on his biography which consisted of millions of words.  He wanted to be remembered but he provided an outstanding view of his world and the circles in which he moved.  While living on the good graces of the Prince de Ligne, he died in 1798.  Yet his biography and writings lived on, first being published in 1822 in German, then in 1826 in French although those were poor versions.  In 1943 his manuscript survived a direct bomb hit by an Allied bomb and in 1945 was saved by Allied forces.  In 2010, the Bibliotheque national de France purchased the manuscript for over $9,000,000, the institution’s most expensive acquisition to date.  In death, Casanova gained the fame and honor he sought all his life.

A few years ago, my wife and I spent a month in France, starting at the Normandy battlefields and driving eastward towards Verdun.  It was an amazing trip as we covered several different wine making areas and ran across many monuments to battles and wars.  It was clear to us that France was a nation that had suffered from hundreds of years of war.  One special find was just outside of the hedgerows of Normandy on a quiet side country road.  A marker had been placed which outlined a skirmish between a U.S. infantry patrol and a German platoon backed up by an armored vehicle.  A small accidental meeting of two groups of men in which the outnumbered and outgunned Americans were pushed back by the Germans.  Some locals had decided to memorialize the long-forgotten clash so that later generations might realize that that lovely, quiet piece of land was not ruled by a hated enemy as it had been liberated at the cost American liberators.

Later during the month, further east, we ran across a beautiful museum which was dedicated to the battle of Gravelotte, during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870.  It is still vivid in my mind as it featured beautiful paintings of the battle which was the costliest of that war.  The displays were so dignified and in keeping with the spirit of the current time and gave equal time and coverage to both the French and the Prussians. What a gem of a museum!

I bring those instances up because it was with great delight that I read a very positive review of Rachel Chrastil’s new book, Bismark’s War, The Franco-Prussian War and The Making of Modern Europe.  While I was familiar with the war, it was primarily due to two biographies of Bismark, one by Alan Palmer and the other by Jonathan Steinberg, plus earlier books detailing the war.  I was therefore surprised at the direction of this book, and I could not recommend this history to anyone who does not have some background of the war. Why?  A few reasons:

1. There is little attempt to put the war in context: Most histories would provide the basics of what led up to the war, which in this case could include Bismark’s two previous wars, the downward spiral of Napoleon III government, the tensions between the southern German states and Prussia, etc. The infamous Ems telegram is mentioned but not discussed.  Given this lack of context, an uninformed reader would wonder why the title when it could have been Napoleon’s War.
2. Military equipment: Why was the Prussian Guards unit so decimated by the French Chassepot rifle and the mitrailleuse and why did the Prussians use the needle gun?  What made the Chassepot such a powerful weapon? Why was the Prussian artillery so superior to the French? How did the confusion at the start of the war on the part of the French impact their strategy? Etc.
3. Personalities: While the major players are named, the reader is expected to know the experience/personality of each, such as von Moltke, von Roon, Crown Prince Wilhelm, etc.  A bit of background would help the average reader understand the strategy and restraints on these individuals.
4. Strategy: Early on there is a brief discussion of how military strategy had been changing, based in part on the foreign observers in the American Civil War.  Unfortunately, that discussion was rather short so one is left to wonder why the lessons of that war were not more fully learned by some of the combatants. What was it about the European mind set that allowed it to ignore the terrible impact of modern weapons with their increase in range and rate of fire?  Did the Europeans view the American experience as not applicable to Europe since the Americans were amateurs whereas the Europeans were the masters of war?
5. Personal detail: Since the war was fought on French soil, it is natural that any discussion on the civilian population would be more French based but there is little discussion regarding the impact on the German population.  How supportive was the average Southern German to the war and did the mobilization of so many men negatively impact those economies?  Nearly all the personal detail was based on the French experience and given the higher literacy rate in Germany, one would expect to find more detail on the attitude of the German civilians from memoirs, news reports, etc.
6. Lastly, how was Bismark able to string together the German coalition give the general dislike and mistrust of the Prussian power, the religious differences between the northern and southern Germans and the natural inclination of many German states to surrender their sovereignty over international affairs.  That story is amazing and shows the brilliance of Bismark, but you will not find out about it here.

The author has done good research in several areas but seems to assume a general knowledge of the average reader.  I believe that being the case that most readers who possess a modem of curiosity will walk away with more questions than answers. I would like to recommend another book for the first time reader of this war: The Franco-Prussian War by Geoffrey Wawro.

Winston Groom is best known for his book (and the hugely successful movie), Forrest Gump.  He is the author of six books as well as the co-author of the 1984 Pulitzer Prize nominee, Conversations with the Enemy.  In this excellent book, he focuses on the Confederate General John Bell Hood and his invasion of Tennessee late in the Civil War.

During that campaign, he attempted to distract Union General William Tecumseh Sherman from his famous campaign which burned out the very heart of the Confederacy during his march from Atlanta to the sea.  Hood was unsuccessful in deterring Sherman and managed at the same time to destroy his army in futile attacks against Union forces.

His failure was not preordained, for his record prior to the Battle of Atlanta had been one of a brave and ferocious fighter.  Although not the brightest of the Confederate generals (he graduated 44^th out of a class of 52), he had served well in several campaigns and was until the Battle of Atlanta, considered a dashing and rising Confederate star.

Although Hood was criticized for his failure to hold Atlanta, one must remember that he entered the campaign late in the game as his predecessor General Joseph E. Johnston had failed to stop Sherman as he advanced on Atlanta.  Yet, despite Hood’s experiences with the power of defensive firepower, Hood threw his army at Sherman in an effort to sweep him from the field.  The attack resulted in thousands of Confederate casualties at a point in the war where they could not be easily replaced.  Hood had to leave Atlanta and some of his glory was lost.

The invasion of Tennessee was a prime example of “what might have been”, as within a short span of forty-eight hours, Hood lost not one, not two, but six opportunities to destroy the Union army that would later turn and destroy his army.  The battle of Franklin decided the campaign but there would be one more defeat at Nashville and with it, the fate of the South was sealed.

Groom provides excellent cameo descriptions of many Union and Confederate leaders throughout the book and his descriptions of the battles will keep the reader going back to read passages for their excitement and detail.  He also goes into the politics and schemes of various senior officers as they attempt to enhance their reputations and positions through a variety of nasty and dubious tricks.

I have often wondered why, aside from an attempt to sooth Southern feelings, a major military based was named after a General who after years of war, did not understand the days of massed Napoleonic charges were over.  He, like General Lee, seemed to have a blind spot to the realities of not having a numeric advantage and the deadliness of “modern” weapons.  Perhaps it is well that the name of Fort Hood has been changed.  Hopefully it is to the name of a more realistic General.

A short book, well written that breaks into three parts: 1) how the people of Rome managed to conqueror and incorporate many of the separate peoples of the Italian peninsula prior to 90 BC, 2) why those people rose in revolt against Rome and Rome’s triumph and 3) the war between Generals Marius and Sulla.  Woven into the history is a tale of governmental corruption on a vast scale by the Senators and Equity class which led to the revolt, the civil war, and the destruction of the Republic. The masses were bought off with entertainment and lost their old virtues.

Marius is painted in a most unflattering light, and to be fair, more should have been said of this General who won so many battles for Rome. The description of Sulla is excellent; pleasure loving but bound to duty, a harsh rule who never forgave a slight and who perfected proscriptions in Rome. The author unfortunately does not mention Sulla’s inscription above his tomb: “I have never had a friend or an enemy I have not repaid in full.”

In the end, it is a book about how a great Republic turned to dictatorship and later, rule by Emperors and finally by bribery.  At the heart of the degeneration is the decline of the populace which ceased to take an interest in their military and who succumbed to lives of entertainment and the public dole.  It is a lesson that should be taught to every child of every nation who wishes to survive.

After conquering most of North America, the United States was filled with success and energy.  The expansion of the economic power of the United States was viewed with awe by the Europeans and dynamic politicians, such as Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge believed that it was the destiny of the United States to carry on into what is now called the “third world” to bring Christianity, modernity and progress to the inhabitants of those regions.  Our soul was pure (unlike the Europeans who only sought to exploit those foreign lands) and we were sure that we would be welcomed with open arms as saviors.

The destruction of the battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana provided the opportunity to Under Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt whose immediate supervisor left the day to day running of the Navy to Roosevelt.  Seizing the opportunity, Roosevelt and his fellow expansionists put in motion a war with Spain which led to not only Roosevelt’s famous charge in Canada but also the destruction of the outdated Spanish fleet in the Philippines.  With the end of the war, the United States paid Spain between $15 to $20 million dollars and in return we ended up with the Philippines.  Simple, except that the local “intelligencia” within the Philippines had their heart set on their setting up and governing an independent Philippines.

In the end, both parties were fooling themselves; the local Philippine leaders had neither the expertise, financing, military strength or history to create a nation, while the U.S. was not prepared for the “dirty” war that it would find itself caught up in as many of the locals responded to the call of local leaders. 

As time went on, and the U.S. responded with great brutality to the guerillas (using the same techniques they learned from the guerillas), the image of a local primitive people welcoming the heroic Americans began to crumble.  The U.S. was in the end able to win the war but it suffered a blow to its self-image thanks to the stories printed in the press which turned against the war as it went on.

Jones has presented story which shows the U.S. to be an aggressor and seems to gloss over the hundreds of schools, medical facilities, etc. which the U.S. constructed.  He also totally ignores how it was that after such a brutal war, the people of the Philippines came to look upon the U.S. with fondness as we promised and moved towards Philippine independence (which was temporarily held up by World War II).  This is a good basic book in helping one to understand the politics of the war and can be a starting point for future reading if one is so inclined.

On a recent voyage, I had a discussion with some Brits about their history history.  The subject of Churchill came up and one elderly lady mentioned what a terrible job he had done with the Dardanelles during the First World War. I was surprised she held that view given the research, commissions, etc. that have been held since the war.  She must have gone through the school system or perhaps her parents belonged to the party which opposed Churchill for her view to be held so long after the fact.  I mentioned some counter information and she was genuinely surprised to hear the information I provided.  History is not dead, and it continues to shape our view of our world.

This brings us to this review of Churchill and the Dardanelles by Christopher M. Bell.  I was familiar with Bell as I had previously read his excellent book, Churchill and Sea Power and this book only goes to increase his reputation as an historian of note.

After the failure of the Dardanelles, there was much finger pointing as to would shoulder the blame for both the naval and army failures.  Was the campaign supported by the major players?  Did the Navy consult with the Army regarding joint action? Did the Navy go into the campaign with a full understanding of the Turkish defenses?  Who oversaw each operation?   The questions went on and on, but the initial blame landed on the desk of Churchill.  As a result, with all the politicians and military leaders running for cover, Churchill who was viewed as head-strong and much too pushy was left alone by most of his political allies.  He lost his position and was all but cast into a political wilderness.  Although the Prime Minister realized that Churchill was being sacrificed and that his skills would be helpful to the war effort, he was simply beyond the pale until tempers cooled down and a more objective analysis of the failures could be found.

Churchill immediately began to build his case for his political resurrection.  He gathered documents, spoke with is political allies and when a commission was formed to review the entire campaign, he labored hard and long for the ability to be actively involved not only to be in the commission but to also examine witnesses who were called.  Although he felt betrayed by Jackie Fisher who he had brought back to the naval board, they realized that they needed one another, and a temporary truce was called.  Numerous witnesses were called and after lengthy hearings, it was decided that Churchill came out with a much-improved position.

Churchill, however, was not one to rest and he took the entire episode to heart, becoming less naïve and careful to work to create his own image.  He used his political allies including the press to reconstruct and improve his image and the publication of his monumental work, The World Crisis in which he managed to paint his actions in the Dardanelles in a positive light while at the same time not burning any political bridges all but secured his resurrected reputation.

Although he would make political errors in the future (re: the Royal abdication, self-rule for India, etc.), he had learned that careful control of the press and public opinion could save him from his own errors.  Lord Birkenhead once commented, “When Winston is right, he is unique. When he is wrong-Oh My God!”.  Churchill knew that history would treat him well because he was determined to write it and write it, he did.  Yes, he made errors and could drive those around him to distraction, but in the end, his legend which he wrote was not that far off the mark.