Penguin Books has introduced a history of Europe from Troy through the present; a massive nine volume history with each period written by a different author.  The historians aside from Evans include Ian Kershaw, Tim Banning and others of worthy note.  This volume reflects the usual attention to detail by Evans (his 3 volume history of the Third Reich is, in my opinion the definitive history of the Third Reich); it is rich in detail and almost overwhelming in providing information that makes the reader stagger under its weight.

Unlike other histories of this period, Evans spends little time rehashing the wars, but rather, creates a political, social, economic and moral history of the various forces unleashed by the wars of Napoleon.  It was Napoleon who brought to Europe the ideals of the French Revolution (although at a terrible price with over 1,000,000 French troops being killed not to mention the slaughter of Germans, Russians, Poles, Italians, etc.).  The victors attempted to create a new order in Europe which would allow them to keep a firm handle on the changes they feared and it continued through the revolutions of 1848 until the rise of nationalism.

If you ever want to learn about the impact of railroads on Europe, or the abolition of Serfdom, the Carlist Wars, the Religious divisions, the rise of Imperialism or the first genocides in Europe (naturally in the Balkans), this is the go to book.  But beyond the major movements, we find who invented words such as “socialism”, “feminism”, “communism” (no it was not Marx or Engels), or the diet of the average Englishman vs. the slave in the United States (the slave in the U.S. was inches taller than the average Englishman reflecting a superior diet!), the practical use of the bustle and countless other bits of trivia, etc. this volume will quench your thirst for the trivia.  Yet, Evans manages to pull it all together so that you have a real feeling of the times and context of Europe during that time.

At the same time, when dealing with the major events (the Carlist Wars, Unification of Germany or Italy, the problems from the revolution of 1848 for the Hapsburg Empire, etc.), you came away with a wonder of how any politicians were able to weather the political storms and demands of the time.  It helps us today as it puts our great problems into an historical context and in its own perverse way, can give the reader optimism for the future; what other leaders did with poorer communication and information were able to accomplish, should make us believe in our own ability to move into the future.

Finally, I have to say that this book is almost a curse.  How?  Because given the quality of the historians for the other volumes, I see myself tied to each volume (this one took me two weeks to read, an inordinately long time) and finding at the end, other releases on the subject will offer little that is new and certainly will not be as entertaining.

This is one of those books that if anyone ever asks, “what books would you recommend on this subject”, you could point to this one volume as the beginning and end of the quest.  Beware if you start down this path, for it shall capture you and hold you close till the end.

The general (of a military and diplomatic career) provides an excellent intimate look at the thinking and logic of Napoleon at that critical time of the Empire.  Having served extensively at the court of the Tsar, de Caulaincourt was able to provide Napoleon with extensive information on the thinking of the Tsar, the country, etc.  The information provided however, was not to Napoleon’s liking and therefore was largely ignored, much to the agony of the Grand Army.  Yet Napoleon kept de Caulaincourt close to him (he was willing to keep those who provided excellent service close to him even if they provided information not to his liking) to the point where on the retreat from Moscow, and especially when Napoleon left the Grand Army, de Caulaincourt escorted him on that long and cold ride through Prussia, into Warsaw, and onto Paris.

 After the fall of Napoleon, he retired from public life and died of cancer in 1827.

This book is a must read for students of Napoleon as it gives an excellent view of his thinking, logic, prejudices, etc.  His views on the restoration of Poland, misreading of the Tsar, etc. are clear and fascinating. 

One of the pleasant things about New Orleans is that you can spend hours in used bookstores, shifting through volumes which reflect the mind set of the locals. I have found a number of gems over the years, and this last trip enabled me to find this excellent volume on RMA (revolutions in military affairs). I have to admit that I had never heard of the book (originally published in 2001 while the volume I found was from its seventh printing in 2008. The last printing was in 2015), but it is a find that I shall keep close. The contributors range from professors of history to the Director of Royal Artillery, British Army. This is short (less than two-hundred pages) but serious book.

According to their thesis, there have been five military revolutions in Western history:

1. The creation of the modern nation state which brought about the discipline of military power.
2. The French Revolution which “merged mass politics and warfare.”
3. The Industrial Revolution which made the nation states to pay, feed, cloth, and arm masses of manpower.
4. The First World War which merged numbers 2 and 3 while “set(ting) the pattern for twentieth-century war, and
5. The Cold War which was cold in the “decisive European and northeast Asian theaters.”

These five RMAs are more important than any momentary tactical advantage (such as the superior use by the Germans of tanks vs. the French use in May 1940). They are more important as they completely change how war is fought across all theaters involved.

Moving into the book, there are separate studies regarding the Western army in seventeenth-century France, the impact of the French Revolution with it dramatic introduction of the mass army, the U.S. Civil war, the Prusso-German RMA of 1840-1871, the Battlefleet revolution of 1885-1914 under the direction of First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher, and of course the First and Second World War.

One might be tempted to ask about the current war in Ukraine and the impact of drones on the battlefield. I believe the authors would not say that drones are a real RMA as they would fall into the category of say, the introduction of the tank in World War I. Yes, they do make an impact, but the initial monopoly by one side was quickly lost and, in many ways, it mirrors the technological battle that was fought during the Battle of the Atlantic.

The writing is decidedly not academic: each section is sharp and well argued with a minimum of excess verbiage. The writing is tight and the average armchair military historian could easily grasp the ideas put forth in each section.

On my posting of September 29, 2025, I reviewed an excellent history of the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905. References were made to a tip of the bayonet history by a Japanese Lieutenant who served in that war. Originally published right after the war, it has been out of print for decades, and I have never been able to find a copy. I mentioned that I was interested in that history to a friend of mine and amazingly, he managed to find an excellent facsimile copy of that book reprinted in 2018. Thank you Christian!

The history gives a wonderful insight into the mindset of early Imperial Japan., during the Meiji era (1868-1912). Filled with pride and ego’s that could be easily bruised, Japan had made magnificent advances into a world that prior to 1868, they could little comprehend. Their advances in education, industrialization, the military, not to mention the coming together of a nation that was ruled by power Samurai clans, each having a history to warfare and political intrigue stretching back hundreds of years was amazing.

Like all industrialized nations of that time, they sought to borrow the phrase from Wilhelmian Germany, their “Place in the Sun.”  This was done via military actions in Korea and China where the Japanese military showed exactly how far they had progressed as they were easily victorious against much less Westernized nations. Yet they were also humiliated by the demands of the Western powers (Russian, Great Britain and Germany), who at the peace table, reversed most of Japan’s gains. In fact, the success of Japan caught the attention of Great Britain who suddenly found a new and dangerous player in an area where they were dominant.

Japan was forced to give back some of their gains but was to a degree mollified as a chief protagonist, Imperial Russia also agreed to honor a pull back on their part. Unfortunately, the Czar, not being the brightest of men, decided that it was important that he push the boundaries of the agreements. The Russian leasing of Port Arthur and fortification of the Liaodong Peninsula (which Japan had been forced to give up in the peace treaty), made the Japanese feel betrayed. Russia was also seeking to gain influence Korea which was seen as a direct threat to Japan. In the end, Japan felt betrayed and shown little respect and Japan declared war on Russia. And thus starts the history of this book.

Anyone who has studied history, especially the Second World War in the Pacific, understands that the Japanese soldier was a tough, brutal opponent. Drafted, trained, often abused, and indoctrinated to honor the emperor who was a god on earth, they were lead by an officer corps that had no regard for the Geneva Convention which attempted to temper the worse horrors of war. The Japanese military had an almost medieval mind set but twentieth-century weapons. Take that mind set and amplify it and you will start to realize the mindset of the author who was a field grade officer.

The pages of the book are riddled with proclamations before every action that he, or his commanding officer or his men that they will die in battle in order to fulfill the commands of the emperor. If the individual returns from battle, many have an intense sense of shame, as if their death would have made the battle even more glorious. While the Japanese military machine had progressed far, it was still a young force backed by a nation with limited resources. In spite of their limited resources, especially their manpower (as opposed to the ever-increasing manpower of the Russians), the infantry commanders including the commanding General in charge of operations, used Russian human wave tactics in their attacks. In one attack, the Japanese suffered over 6,000 casualties (which would be like the U.S. losing 45,000 in one battle). Such losses are the basis for the title of the book. Many infantry battles were fought at night, when the Russians used search lights to expose and blind the attacking Japanese who were mercilessly cut down by machine gun fire.

Mentally, each battle or probing attacked was viewed as an individual’s final attack; individuals would expose themselves to fire as they hurled insults at the Russians (who no doubt could not understand a single word) and were instantly cut down. Yet the author, was either a fanatical believer or painted a (to the Japanese of that time) picture of a glorious warrior, the modern-day image of the samurai. In fact, the patriotism, the belief in the beauty of death in battle is so loud, that it is like something a child would think of what war is like. Either a child’s mentality or that of a jihadist.

It is a fascinating book, and there are small glimpses of humanity (a shared water bottle with a dying man who has not only been shot, but run over by horse and iron wheels of their own artillery), but on whole, it is a book from a different age, one which fortunately is largely disparaged today.

Originally published almost fifty-years ago, this book is considered a classic history of the first war in which an Asian power defeated a European power. The authors do a wonderful job of putting the war in context, firstly by providing a thorough review of the Japanese response to the “opening of Japan” by the Americans and surprisingly, the Russians. They review the various strong warrior clans in a developing Japan and how the politics between those clans colored the strategy and conduct of the war.

They also provide a good overview of Russia which was as always, seeking to absorb more lands. Holding together the vast Russian empire was the trans-Siberian railroad. A single tracked ribbon of steel stretching nearly 9300 kilometers (about 5800 miles), was built poorly and with minimum safety. Entire sections of the track would shift and fall apart every year as they were laid directly on the permafrost, which could melt just enough to make sections subject to disintegration. To make communications, travel, and supply movements more difficult, the track stopped at Lake Baikal, the world’s seventh largest lake. Everything on the trains would have to be unloaded and shipped across the lake during the warmer months of the year. Trying to supply an army using this one-track railway extended the war and led to poor discipline within the army as munitions and food were slow in arriving.

The two nations clashed over several areas, including Korea, Manchuria, and China. China, having suffered defeats by the Japanese and force infringements by Russia, lay all but helpless as Russia and Japan moved to seize and hold what land they could. Land and resources were seized, railroads built to the distress of the Chinese and Chinese officials were corrupted even more than was standard practice within the Chinese government.

The siege of Port Arthur and the great naval battle of Tsushima of course are the main parts of the history. Both opponents faced difficulties which ended up limiting the length of the war. For the Russians, the main problem was the huge distance between Moscow and Port Arthur. Communications were poor, providing munitions to the slowly transported army was daunting, along with an officer corps that had few professional skills made any moves by the field army difficult, slow, and usually always a bit late. The Japanese were like the Russians, willing to throw manpower at any problem. But manpower was not enough so Japan’s limited technological base and lack of capital meant that the Japanese had to seek a quick victory as time could favor the Russians.

Eventually Port Arthur fell to the Japanese but one great test was still ahead for the waring powers; could the Russians said a fleet from the Baltic to fight the Japanese and could the Japanese navy which had suffered telling losses to the Russians, defeat the approaching Russian ships. The fact that the Russian fleet completed the voyage is amazing as they had to put up with poor food, an revolutionary undercurrent between the officers and men, numerous mechanical failures and the fact that every extra inch was occupied by bags of coal which were not only dirty, but hindered the efficiency of the ships. In the end, although the Japanese defeated their foe, it was not a battle loaded with brilliance, but rather a battle determined by luck and poor shooting on the part of the Russians.

Wars eventually come to an end and the mediation of Theodore Roosevelt took two exhausted nations and provided them with at least a modem of national honor. But, as no good deed does not go unpunished, in the end both Japan and Russia viewed the American effort as decidedly negative, thus tainting relations between the three nations for decades to come.

This is a fine book, professionally researched and footnoted, professionally written and showing a grasp not just of the top of history, but the real forces that move events. My only regret was that it took me almost fifty-years to reread it.

This is an outstanding and very readable history of the Imperial Austrian Army which was a major player in European history from 1619 until 1918. Although often pictured as an army which was poorly led and had a terrible record, the facts are altogether different. During its existence, it won more than 350 major victories, far more than its defeats (imagine the scope of European warfare; 350 major victories meant more than one major battle for each year of existence). It was never completely destroyed (as was the Prussian army at Jena) and adapted despite several defeats at the hands of Napoleon to eventually be instrumental in the coalition that destroyed his power.

Much more sweeping in scope than “The Army of Francis Joseph” by G. Rothenberg or “History of the Hapsburg Empire” by Robert Kahn, it nevertheless presents information that will be of interest to the novice and the expert.

Overall, the Hapsburg dynasty was, in my opinion, much stronger in terms of ability to produce successful monarchs than any of the other European monarchies. They did not have their George III or Nicholas II, nor the wasteful Louis XIV.

This is the first book I have read by Bassett and based on his skill as an historian and writer, I shall be looking to read more of his books.

First published in 1942 in Italy, Luigi Albertini’s The Origins of the War of 1914 (three volumes, about 2200 pages) traces the political, diplomatic, and military causes of the war, going as far back to the compromise between Austria and Hungary in 1867 and its impact which would ripple through Europe for decades. He takes the reader step by step along a path that ends in war. The way he lays out the events in Europe, one can see with the advantage of hindsight how so many European decisions naturally led to war.
The work itself is recognized as one of the two or three most important books on the subject and Albertini provides the reader military and diplomatic dispatches, notes on policy meetings held by France, Germany, Russia, and other nations. We are exposed to the lies, corruption, political back biting and conflicting interests of the leaders of nations and those who serve them. Just as today we face what is known as the “deep state,” in nineteenth and early twentieth century nations, generals, bureaucrats, industrialist, and others followed their individual interests, often at the expense of their own nations.
Humanity with all of its weaknesses and faults parades before the reader who is left shaking his or her head at the sheer number of foolish decisions. There is little nobility to be seen as:
• We see the stupidity of the Russian Czar who did not realize that he could not mobilize only a portion of his forces and the generals who lied to him.
• We see the Italian leaders who dreamt of expansion in the Balkans with the result that they sold their nation to the highest bidders.
• We see the German Kaiser, known for his bluff and bluster who pales as he realizes what is about to be unleashed thanks to his overweening ego.
• There is the Kaiser Franz Joseph, an old, tired man used by his Chief of the General Staff into issuing an ultimatum which no nation could accept.
• The assassin, Gavrilo Princip never regrets unleashing a war that would lead to millions of deaths and would open the door to a second war with tens of millions of dead, all in the name of a “Greater Serbia.”
• Britian’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey did not realize the danger Europe faced even though his nation had been in a naval race with the strongest land power in Europe.
• France fueled the rearmament of Russia in order to encircle Germany in a war of revenge using tactics that had cost them the last war with Germany.
There is no end to the players who each did their part to bring on the war. The list of long forgotten European foreign ministers, generals and officials can be daunting to keep straight precisely because none of them acted in a responsible manner, one which would slow down the slide to war.
Nations and their leaders have long memories. A quick decision by one nation can lead to a grievance of another that will last for decades. Yesterday’s allies are tomorrow’s foe for as Charles de Gaulle said decides later, “Treaties are like roses and young girls. They last while they last.” Unfortunately for Europe, the treaties of both sides were honored and paid for with the blood of millions.

A massive biography which covers the first half of Wellington’s life. Not being the first son, he was relegated to joining the military (under British custom, the first son inherited the title, the second went to the military and the third son entered the Church of England).

As was common at the time, Wellington had an unhappy childhood and like many men of that time, he made his mark and fortune in India. His military victories and diplomatic skill in India allowed him to assume command in the Peninsula during the Napoleonic wars where he reorganized the army of Portugal and created the famous defensive lines which the French under a number of Napoleon’s generals refused to attack. In a series of brilliant maneuvers, he out generaled every force sent against him as he slowly pushed the French out of the entire peninsula. That does not mean that he had an easy time as Napoleon poured men and material into the fight, but his real struggle was with various politicians and powers in London who were jealous of his successes and who kept Wellington’s forces on a strict leash.

Unlike other Wellington biographies, Muir provides excellent insight into Wellington’s excellent political skills not only in India, but also in Europe where he moved with ease. He was recognized as skillful, even tempered, and able to bring various factions together after the defeat of Napoleon.

He was a man of his age but also a man of a different age. Unlike most commanders of that time, he took great care for his men, ensuring that they had adequate food and logistical support. He may have been arrogant and superior in his manner to his men, but unlike Napoleon, he was careful with their lives and tried to avoid the typical frontal attacks which so wasted his opponent’s armies.

This is a long read, incredibly detailed, but for a serious scholar, an excellent biography on a complex individual.

Covering the period between 1450-1620, Hale brings into play all the forces around which everyday life evolved in Europe.  He traces the slow development of the roads, art, economics, religion, how the old warrior class took on new leadership roles and the slow gradual realization of national identities.  The concept of national identities could not have been achieved without the constant warfare of the age so while the time was often bloody for a small percentage of the overall population, the development of industries necessary for the wars themselves create economic opportunities and the build up of wider areas of cross trade.

Aside from the usual topics one would expect in a book like this, he also spends time looking at the daily lives of ordinary people and how they lived.   How did they dress, where did they shop, how were rules of civility created and enforced? What and how did a common language develop in any geographical area and how did that common language unite the people in becoming what we know as France or Germany, etc.  How were the average people able to live during the upheavals in Christianity which were driven not only by religious differences, but also by the various local rulers who saw the time as an opportunity to enrich themselves by pillaging monasteries, churches, etc. 

The book is not an especially easy read; not because it is not well written, for it is, but the amount of information available is extraordinary.  This is due not only to the usual method of using a wide brush, but also because he delves into the ordinary and discusses how movements, ideas, etc. could impact the people of Europe down to the poorest peasant.  It falls into the category of books that if one were ever asked to read one book on a subject, would the one recommended. 

Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brede et de Montesquieu was from the middle of the 18th century through the founding of the United States, widely considered to be the preeminent political thinker of his time. His categorization of what constitutes a tyranny, an empire and a republic influenced our Founding Fathers in their debates and in the writing of the Federalist Papers. He was the principal architect of the theory of separation of powers and his main work, The Spirit of Law (1748) was well received throughout Europe and the thirteen colonies.

This work is considered a minor work, but I would like to suggest that no politician be allowed to take office until they have read and passed a test based on what he writes in this gem of a book.

Rome, like any organism or organization, had a period of growth followed by a decline. What were the causes of its growth? That is often asked as is, what caused its decline? Historians and others will argue those points for as long as Rome is remembered and everyone who attempts to answer those questions will be both correct and wrong. There were numerous causes but that in the end, as with other empires, the entire system simply imploded from lack of will, moral degeneracy and outside pressures that were simply more than could be managed given the resources available. Over time, the ideals and energy which helped the successful growth were lost and there were not enough good and strong men and women to hold the center together.

 Rome started as a small community, cut off from the sea, surrounded by numerous enemies, many of them larger. It had little natural wealth, barely any art and the citizens realized that the only way to enrich themselves was through pillage. Montesquieu believed that Rome’s power came from several factors, among them a constant drive for war, an unwillingness to accept defeat, an equal sharing of the plunder and a government which only allowed recognition and advancement through military success. Because Rome was always at war and because they adopted the best military practices of their individual neighbors, they simply excelled at war. They easily adopted the best skills of their military foes, such as cavalry, the Spanish short sword, etc. and use each in a way that helped to insure their victories. They developed a mindset which directed all activities of the State to be in the successful furtherance of war. Defeat was simply unacceptable and as was demonstrated during the war against Hannibal, no matter how often Roe’s field armies were defeated, they simply kept going after their nemesis until they achieved final victory. Such a mindset is not possible today as the technology of war simply makes war too expensive both in treasure and lives. So, what can we learn from the Romans? We can learn from them the reasons for their decline.