The Magadan area of Siberia is known for its harsh climate, where the weather is sub-zero for up to six months a year.  Now picture that you are in that climate, working in a lead or gold mine (which tend to kill its workers in about six months) in a thin cotton jacket and wooden clogs.  You want to get a better job, but you have nothing to trade to the criminals who run the camp with the approval of the military guards.  Your diet consists of a cup of hot water for breakfast, perhaps a slice of bread for lunch and if you make it back to the barracks in time, a cup of hot water with perhaps a fish head or a bit of turnip.  Then after lights out, you wait for the criminals to rob you of your blanket or gang rape your bunk mate.  If you do manage to get out of the mines, you get a better job such as cutting trees for 12 hours a day.  You do not know what has happened to your family (as you are held without the right of correspondence) and you realize that that routine will go on for the length of your sentence, which is probably fifteen to twenty years.

When you do come out of the camp, you may not receive a permit to return to the town where your family lived and there are few ways to contact them.  In fact, everyone who encounters you shuns you as being seen with a former “political” may be reason enough for them to be arrested.  There is a good chance that your children were put in State orphanages and had their names changed so there is little possibility of ever finding them.  In fact, you have only a small chance of ever leading a “normal” life.

This then was the story of this early work by one of the premier historians on the Soviet Union.  Conquest lays out a story of brutality that is an important part of the Gulag system of the Soviet Union.  And, as terrible as the above description is of life in the camps, it was worse for the women who were sentenced to the Gulag.  From mass rape on the transportation to the camps, to forced lesbian relationships in order to gain a bit more to eat, women were the lowest of the low in the system.

It is often said that the camps were not the fault of the ideology, but rather the fault of the leaders.  But what type of system would allow the leaders to develop a system staffed by hundreds of thousands of brutal individuals who could live and work in a system like the Gulags.  What type of system would allow to be created a system of laws and regulations where people are arrested and convicted based on nothing more than a quota for arrests and, in some cases, being picked out at random from a telephone book.

Each time I read something on the Gulag system, I thank my lucky stars for the life I lead, in the country where I live which is a true anomaly in the history of mankind.   There but for the grace of God, or the decision of my grandparents could have gone I.

The British and German empires had the wonderful ability to turn futility and defeat into a glorious adventure. For the Germans, and outstanding example was the legend of the Langemarck when youthful German infantry rushed against the French lines, singing their national anthem, and capturing thousands of French regulars. The reality was quite different in that while a thousand French reservists were captured, the young Germans suffered about ten thousand killed and wounded in an unimportant battle. Years later, the myth would be used by the Nazi regime to fire the imagination of those in the Hitler Youth.

The British, because of their far-flung empire had more glorious defeats which they could use to inspire British boys. It must have worked as generations of youth ventured forth to pacify, tame and Christianize the colonies of the Empire. One of those defeats was the Artic expedition of Captain Sir John Franklin in 1845-48. He had at his disposal two specially designed ships with food and fuel enough for three years and a desire to find the fabled Northwest Passage. He failed and all the men of his ships died of scurvy, TB, various other illnesses and eventually resorted to cannibalism in a vain attempt to reach rescue.

Lenin, the great icon of Communism, was raised and lived the life of a bourgeois. Cared for and pampered by his mother and family, then by his wife Nadya Krupskaya, he could not live on his meager earnings and so continually received money from his mother and from the donations of wealthy liberal capitalists who did not understand his total hatred of them. He lived a life dedicated to revolution, but never raised a fist in anger, never stood on the barricades and was known to flee at the first sign of violence. Yet, when power came to him, he easily ordered the deaths of real and supposed enemies, including those who had opposed him philosophically.

In several reviews, this book was praised for exposing the real Lenin, for breaking the shell which had been carefully crafted creating an image of benign intellectualism detached from the slaughter’s instituted by Stalin. Yet the book, if read without a knowledge of the seizure of power, the Civil War and the creation of the Soviet state would not in and of itself destroy the myth of the peaceable Lenin. There are only a couple of examples of his willingness to shed blood, as when the elevator in the Kremlin was not working for a few days and Lenin demanded that the maintenance man be shot, or more seriously, when there was famine in the countryside. At that time, Lenin was approached with an appeal to ease up on the countryside food seizures, but his response was that it was an ideal time to begin the liquidation of the priests and churches as people’s attention would be diverted. In reality, Lenin was a driving force behind the formation and actions of the Cheka, ‘the sword and shield’ of the Communist Party. Like Stalin after him, Lenis read the list of those executed as well as personally signing the lists of those awaiting execution.

Aside from not exposing the ruthlessness of Lenin, the rest of the book does reflect Lenin’s ability to bring others to his way of thinking and his excellent sense of timing, politically. Although like others, he was surprised by the overthrow of the Tsar (just as decades later everyone was surprised by the collapse of the Soviet Union), he reacted quickly to return to Russia and pick up the direction of the revolution. Although his face was not even recognized in Russia, he was able to direct and corral the energy of the times and the streets to successfully seize power. Then, thanks to his drive and the skills of men like Trotsky, Dzerzhinsky, and others, the first Communist government was able to survive war, famine, civil war and more.

This is an excellent biography of a man who has been immortalized as a brilliant thinker and leader but misunderstood. His self-centeredness, intellect, patience, and ruthlessness are all laid out for examination. For anyone seeking to have a better understanding how such a terrible system could be founded and survive with such a small base of support, read this book.

Born into the family of a WWI hero and early support of the Fascist movement in Italy, Ciano was not only Mussolini’s son on law, but also his Foreign Minister from late 1936-1943. Later he voted, in the Supreme Fascist Council, to oust Mussolini from power and at that time was also purged from all political life.

His diary is honest; it deals with many of the personalities of the time, the pressures, issues, and his attempts to steer Mussolini from war and close collaboration with Hitler and the Nazis. A combat flyer himself, he took part in multiple combat missions to show the population that the leadership could lead by example. Although Mussolini was in power for many years, Ciano as head of the Foreign Office was as surprised as Mussolini at the poor state of the Italian military at the start of the war. Recognizing that the country was bankrupt and suffering from severe food shortages, Ciano tried to convince Il Duce to not enter the war, but Mussolini saw himself as a great wartime leader, believing in his own press clippings that he himself wrote.

It is clear from the Diary that Mussolini had a poor grasp on the economics of his country, was totally taken in by Hitler and had dreams of empire far beyond the abilities of the Fascist state. Should Italy move against Yugoslavia? How about Greece? Perhaps France! Turning first one direction and then the other, Mussolini ignored the basics of governance and had an utter distain for the Italian people (whom he called “sheep,” “weak,” etc. and the Catholic Church. In a country where the Church still held enormous influence (even though the people seldom went to mass), he failed to heed the lesson of the old Roman Empire that the one area government left alone was the religion of the people.

Foiled in numerous attempts to stop Mussolini from going to war, Ciano gradually lost power as the influence of the Nazis grew in Italy. His descriptions of leaders, such as Ribbentrop, Himmler, Pavelic as well as the hatred of the Hungarians and Romanians as they struggled to attain their illusions of importance often leave one shaking one’s head at the foolishness and ignorance of the many players in Europe. When Japan went to war, they believed that at best they could attain a compromise peace with the United States, but Mussolini refused to believe in nothing less than victory, even as he lost armies in North Africa, Greece, and Russia. Like Napoleon, he played with lives with utter disregard for the misery he was creating.

In January 1944, Ciano was tried by the rump Mussolini government in Verona and executed. His diary has been published in pieces, but this edition is the complete manuscript.

A revolution is a terrible time of death and destruction. Some revolutions are justified, some are not; some are begun with the highest of intentions, some are started with the most common of intentions. If followed by a civil war, the misery and destruction to lives, property, morals, industry, and traditions is even greater. Finally, add an ignorant and easily led mass of humanity that has suffered under a form of government which has only used those masses for its own enrichment, and you will begin to understand the revolution and civil war in what was known as Russia from 1917-1921. Millions of people, most of them innocent and caught between forces they neither supported nor understood were tortured, raped, robbed, and murdered often by methods that only the most insane and hate filled savages could have devised.

Anthony Beevor, an excellent military historian has tried to put together in one place a comprehensive history of the Russian revolution and civil war. It was a huge task as the period is filled with countless political, military and outlaw factions that ranged across a land that covers one-seventh of the globe. Each faction is filled with personalities guided by, for the most part, the basest of emotions, greed, illusions of grandeur, ignorance, hatred, etc. Few of those factions have any real program except survival and a hope that they can eliminate some other faction that is in the neighboring town or province. They are used and discarded by allies and often just as quickly ally themselves with yesterday’s foe.

All do except the Communist faction. Driven by a vision that was simple for the most ignorant to grasp, and enforced by a single-minded discipline, the Communists were, from a central position able to fight and defeat their poorly disciplined enemies. In a time when entire villages were destroyed for providing horses or food to one faction, normally at the point of a gun, the “Reds” as the Communists were called, were able to our terrorize the masses and their foes, the “Whites”, a loose group of armies over-officered, reactionary and possessing no simple program to offer anyone in the middle.

Canada, the land of happiness, a land where its citizens are loved worldwide (for not being American) and a land where the government on the side of every citizen. Except if you are an investor.

In this book the Rosen’s (the father, Al, is a forensic accountant) point out how Canadas lax laws and weak enforcement of basic accounting principles have left the average Canadian exposed to the ravages of swindlers both inside and outside of corporations. How is this possible?

• Firstly, Canada does not have the equivalent of the SEC; there are provincial securities regulators, but they try to balance the needs of the investors with those of the corporations who bring business to the provinces
• Secondly, the accountants and auditors in Canada regulate themselves; in fact, “Canada is the only major country in the world that allows the same people who audit public companies to financially control the process that sets the auditing rules.”
• Thirdly, according to the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that audited reports are prepared for the guidance of current shareholders and that those reports and the auditors who prepare them have no responsibility to perspective shareholders nor creditors
• Fourthly, Canada has moved to the Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) which standard throughout most of the world, as opposed to the GATT standard used in the U.S. In the opinion of the authors, the IFRS standard “…perpetuates toothless financial reporting and costly, but valueless, auditing in Canada.” where investors will have to do their own investigations to determine the value of the numbers.

All of this may sound a bit boring and mechanical, but Canada suffers from repeated financial disaster which have cost retirement funds and individual Canadians hundreds of billions of dollars of losses. Under the Canadian system, liabilities can be kept off the books to inflate the value of stocks which allows corporate executives to claim large bonuses, artificially drive up the price of stocks and provide insiders with major windfalls on stock options. In fact, under the Canadian system, the auditors can knowingly misstate the numbers and they have no financial liability. When corporations are caught, their punishments usually consist of a slap on the hand for the top securities regulator says that Canada believes in rehabilitation as opposed to punishment.

An example of outcome of Canadian practices is the closing of Nortel, Canada’s largest corporation. While Enron was a $50 billion-dollar disaster, the cost of Nortel was seven times larger (over $350,000,000,000). Given the difference in size of the U.S. and Canada, it would be as if Enron crashed and destroyed $5 Trillion of shareholders money.

This book has become more timely given the accounting practices that are being uncovered regarding companies out of China and the failure of regulators in Germany regarding the scandal with Wire card. Investing outside of the U.S. requires the average person to be much more circumspect and knowledgeable about the laws and accounting practices of any individual country. The difference in laws, procedures, enforcement and yes, accounting practices can expose the unwary to huge risks. There is a long record of disasters due to practices which would not be allowed in the U.S.; the crash of the Mexican Peso, the banking crisis of Japan, corruption in Brazil and most certainly the whims of the Party in China should make any investor concerned about any opportunity. When financial times get tough, no one stashes their money in China, Japan, Russia, France or, yes, Canada, and there are good reasons.

Although it deals with a topic that should be dry to the average reader, the authors writing will make the reader put the book down and laugh that such lax regulation and disregard for citizens can permitted in Canada.

From the outbreak of the war in August 1914 until the end, November 1918, Major Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck led a small group of German troops and militia and 10,000 native Black Askaris in a campaign across much of central Africa. Cut off from his homeland, he and his troops lived off the land and the supplies they were able to capture from the British who were charged with capturing or destroying his force. What should have been an easy campaign against the small German force turned out to tied up 300,000 British Empire troops commanded by 130 generals which were needed in the European theater.

Always staying one step ahead of the British and often taking the fight, successfully to the British, the Germans had to not only survive the battles, but live in a climate of extreme heat, lack of water, diseases and insects which could infect a man with a disease that could cause death in a single day. Without a source of steady supply, the Germans resorted to sneak attacks on supply depots for food, shoes, medicines, and clothing. Slowly the two thousand Germans were whittled away through battle and disease, yet they survived in part because they learned to move like the natives in small, fast groups with a minimal of supplies while the British relied on slow moving columns followed and hindered by thousands of camp followers.

When the war ended, von Lettow-Vorbeck thought that the news might be a British trick, but he was finally convinced. The biggest problem came from his Askaris who could not understand why they had to surrender as they felt they were winning! In the end, the native troops almost started a rebellion but were finally convinced that they had to go home. Unfortunately, they were treated poorly by the British who exhibited a

 very racist attitude which they carried over from their treatment of the natives in India.

This is an excellent history of a campaign which has been largely overlooked by historians. It is a shame that the author did not cover the history of the German rule in Africa as it was both better and worse than that of the French and British. Better in that they created more schools and hospitals for the natives than the other Europeans but worse in that the Germans put down a revolt in 1905 that cost the lives of 300,000 natives. Despite the brutality of the German response, there was never any problem with the natives who served with the Germans during World War I.

A small book that demonstrates the human spirit and ability to survive against great odds.

“Talking about ‘healthy masculinity’ is like talking about ‘healthy cancer” and “Traditional masculinity has oppressed girls and women and limited the identity construction of all boys and men.”  But let us not forget, “we need to call masculinity out as a hazardous ideology and denounce anyone who chooses to identify with it.”  Thus begins a review of No Apologies: Why Civilization Depends on the Strength of Men by Anthony Esolen (the review is by Noah M Peterson.

Mr. Esolen has written a rebuttal to statements like those and others that attack the concept of masculinity that has evolved for thousands of years. His rebuttals include examples of how civilization was built by the very forces that are condemned so readily today; men’s drive to create and conquer (which motivated technological development), men’s willingness to fight (not only physically but mentally) and other traits that have moved humans forward from the darkest caves.

Peterson, points out that while the author is only half right in some areas, such as his assertion that “Every typical difference between the behaviors of boys and girls can be seen as the natural expression of the forms of their bodies”, he is consistent in following his views to their logical if controversial conclusions.  For example, are women incapable of “dispassionate analysis”? Was government created by men to protect women and children?

 Esolen fails in his discussion of virtue in that he does not “provide a standard of virtuous masculinity that men can strive for….”  If virtue is a means of restraint, how is a boy growing into manhood be taught when to use his strength and drive and when to temper it? This is a question that cannot be answered by a secularist for what is the higher universal standard of a secularist? Perhaps the answer regarding virtue can be more easily answered by those who believe in a higher purpose and being? This is not covered in this discussion.

The questions and conclusions Esolen cover may infuriate some, but all we need to do is recall the quotes at the start of this review and then remember that we are also told that no one is attacking masculinity.

https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/boys-to-men-2/

How was it possible for the United States Army, which numbered less than 200,000 men and which was smaller than the army of Portugal, would go on to defeat Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan, while only losing one battle during the Second World War? How was it able to put into the field, armies which managed to beat the hardened professional armies of its enemies? The answer can be found to a large degree in this outstanding book by Geoffrey Perret.

One leader does stand out above all the rest, and it is not the President, Franklin Delanor Roosevelt; it is the man he picked out for the job of creating the U.S. fighting force, George C. Marshall. Marshall was a man who knew how to surround himself with the best of the best, both in the administration of the army and in the field. A tireless worker, he expected the same of those around him and he did not hesitate to demote or retire high ranking officers who failed in their jobs. That type of ruthlessness saved lives and was expected of every officer no matter what his rank. He also realized that the old style of thinking in the military, that of matching the enemies’ weapons, one to one was outdated. Marshall managed to skip a generation of military thought in creating a fighting force that simply was better trained, better educated, more creative and better supplied than any other military of its day. Since the focus of this volume is on the army per se, the author does not delve into the genius of the American industry who overcame so many hurtles to deliver the tanks, ships and planes needed by the military, but he does give many examples of the excellence of what was provided.

The Russian army has had moments of brilliance, such as the defeat of Napoleon and the logistical miracle of following him from Moscow to Paris. There is no doubt that the army which was responsible for ninety percent of German losses in WWII (thanks in large part to the supplies provided by the U.S. and the U.K. at no charge) played a key part in the defeat of Hitler.

Today however, we see a Russian army that sadly fits the stereotype in many people’s minds; poorly trained, led and equipped. Once again, without total mobilization, the Russian army is simply too small and poorly led for the job of defending its immense country.

Is the stereotype accurate when looking at the Russian army currently in the field? This book helps to put the challenges of that army in an historical context.

With the defeat during the Crimean War, the new Czar realized that his army while large, could not compete with those of other European nations.  Thus began, over the next 50 years, attempts to update the military skills of the officer corp., the weapons, training, etc. of the entire Imperial Army.  But serious questions arose and continued to rise as rapid changes in military technology raised doubts about long held beliefs and new theories of the military art.  Those same questions would worry the military minds of other European powers.  To give a couple of examples:

• The old theory was that the troops would line up for attack at 250 paces from the enemy, but with smokeless powder (hence a longer range), that distance began to expand to 500 paces, then 1000 and eventually over a kilometer and a half from the enemy forces.  This meant that the killing ground was expanded and what steps could be taken to minimize lives?
• Along with the infantry, direct fire artillery since the time of Napoleon had played a major part in any attack or defense.  But with the longer range of infantry weapons, the artillerist was more open to withering fire so new tactics such as indirect fire had to be worked out.

Many officers had theories to answer these and other questions, but at the same time there were vested interests which refused to acknowledge these and many other problems.  Top generals, who fought during the Napoleonic wars still believed in the shock value of cavalry, and their influence ate up huge sums of the military budget.

Financial concerns were also a top priority.  Training was often poor, especially further away from St. Petersburg and due to tight budgets, for example, the artillery was limited to only two rounds of certain types of ammunitions per gun per year!  Bullets were expensive so large rattles were used to imitate the sound of machine guns firing. 

And yet, despite the stereotype of the dark plodding masses, gradually the army learned and moved on; allowances for more initiative at the lower levels was encouraged and a Staff school was set up to create a more professional officer class.  A major problem however, was that seniority still ruled and the more professional staff officers were cut off from reaching the highest levels.

The book covers not only the areas above, but a basic description of the war with Turkey (1877-78) and Japan (1904-05) to the eve of WWI.  It does not go into the financial arrangements with France which lead to much of Russia’s fail development prior to the war (all of which was aimed at moving the Russian army faster against Germany), but does give some detail on the under estimation of the Russian army as to the amount of munitions needed for modern war (despite the experience of the war with Japan), but then so did most of the other European nations.

An interesting book for the military historian, but it can be dry and academic.  I would like to see similar books on the German and French armies during the same time.op

iance, such as the defeat of Napoleon including it logistical excellence in its ability to follow him all the way to Paris. There is no doubt that it won the Second World War by inflicting ninety percent of the German casualities (helped in large part by the supplies provided at no cost by the U.S. Yet currently, we see a Russian army that fits the

With the defeat during the Crimean War, the new Czar realized that his army while large, could not compete with those of other European nations.  Thus began, over the next 50 years, attempts to update the military skills of the officer corp., the weapons, training, etc. of the entire Imperial Army.  But serious questions arose and continued to rise as rapid changes in military technology raised doubts about long held beliefs and new theories of the military art.  Those same questions would worry the military minds of other European powers.  To give a couple of examples:

• The old theory was that the troops would line up for attack at 250 paces from the enemy, but with smokeless powder (hence a longer range), that distance began to expand to 500 paces, then 1000 and eventually over a kilometer and a half from the enemy forces.  This meant that the killing ground was expanded and what steps could be taken to minimize lives?
• Along with the infantry, direct fire artillery since the time of Napoleon had played a major part in any attack or defense.  But with the longer range of infantry weapons, the artillerist was more open to withering fire so new tactics such as indirect fire had to be worked out.

Many officers had theories to answer these and other questions, but at the same time there were vested interests which refused to acknowledge these and many other problems.  Top generals, who fought during the Napoleonic wars still believed in the shock value of cavalry, and their influence ate up huge sums of the military budget.

Financial concerns were also a top priority.  Training was often poor, especially further away from St. Petersburg and due to tight budgets, for example, the artillery was limited to only two rounds of certain types of ammunitions per gun per year!  Bullets were expensive so large rattles were used to imitate the sound of machine guns firing. 

And yet, despite the stereotype of the dark plodding masses, gradually the army learned and moved on; allowances for more initiative at the lower levels was encouraged and a Staff school was set up to create a more professional officer class.  A major problem however, was that seniority still ruled and the more professional staff officers were cut off from reaching the highest levels.

The book covers not only the areas above, but a basic description of the war with Turkey (1877-78) and Japan (1904-05) to the eve of WWI.  It does not go into the financial arrangements with France which lead to much of Russia’s fail development prior to the war (all of which was aimed at moving the Russian army faster against Germany), but does give some detail on the under estimation of the Russian army as to the amount of munitions needed for modern war (despite the experience of the war with Japan), but then so did most of the other European nations.

An interesting book for the military historian, but it can be dry and academic.  I would like to see similar books on the German and French armies during the same time.