After conquering most of North America, the United States was filled with success and energy.  The expansion of the economic power of the United States was viewed with awe by the Europeans and dynamic politicians, such as Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge believed that it was the destiny of the United States to carry on into what is now called the “third world” to bring Christianity, modernity and progress to the inhabitants of those regions.  Our soul was pure (unlike the Europeans who only sought to exploit those foreign lands) and we were sure that we would be welcomed with open arms as saviors.

The destruction of the battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana provided the opportunity to Under Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt whose immediate supervisor left the day to day running of the Navy to Roosevelt.  Seizing the opportunity, Roosevelt and his fellow expansionists put in motion a war with Spain which led to not only Roosevelt’s famous charge in Canada but also the destruction of the outdated Spanish fleet in the Philippines.  With the end of the war, the United States paid Spain between $15 to $20 million dollars and in return we ended up with the Philippines.  Simple, except that the local “intelligencia” within the Philippines had their heart set on their setting up and governing an independent Philippines.

In the end, both parties were fooling themselves; the local Philippine leaders had neither the expertise, financing, military strength or history to create a nation, while the U.S. was not prepared for the “dirty” war that it would find itself caught up in as many of the locals responded to the call of local leaders. 

As time went on, and the U.S. responded with great brutality to the guerillas (using the same techniques they learned from the guerillas), the image of a local primitive people welcoming the heroic Americans began to crumble.  The U.S. was in the end able to win the war but it suffered a blow to its self-image thanks to the stories printed in the press which turned against the war as it went on.

Jones has presented story which shows the U.S. to be an aggressor and seems to gloss over the hundreds of schools, medical facilities, etc. which the U.S. constructed.  He also totally ignores how it was that after such a brutal war, the people of the Philippines came to look upon the U.S. with fondness as we promised and moved towards Philippine independence (which was temporarily held up by World War II).  This is a good basic book in helping one to understand the politics of the war and can be a starting point for future reading if one is so inclined.

Davies is in my opinion, the foremost living historian on Eastern Europe; his books on the Warsaw uprising of 1944, the histories of Central Europe (those countries comprising of Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states, etc.), are outstanding examples of, in my opinion, objective history.  This book is a bit different from his others in topic as it covers the war in Europe from 1939-1945, on several levels such as military action, politics (before, during and after), soldiers, civilians, and portrayals (in movies, literature and history). 

Those separate sections give both the novice and serious historian excellent reference points as they give an overview of those areas which I have found are often forgotten by other similar histories.  As an example, the section on soldiers covers such sub-topics as identity, enlistment, training, officers, discipline, generals, a brief section on each of the sub sections such as artillery, engineers, etc.  This approach allows the reader to go beyond the typical history to better understand the complexity of the subject and plan out further reading.  And, as these sections cover both the Allies and Axis powers, an excellent comparison can be found in numerous areas.

It does not matter if you are a novice to World War II or a self-proclaimed expert, this is one book which will provide an excellent overview of the European war, not from the overall strategic side or individual battles, but rather from the perspective of logistics, human needs, and military management.  I would recommend No Simple Victory.  Interesting, concise, inclusive it provides an excellent touch stone and one which will allow the reader to easily go back to review some facts which were of special interest.

This is Stephen Ambrose at his best; after conducting interviews with over 1000 veterans, on both sides of the line, and reviewing outstanding studies by Russell Weigley, Paul Fussell and other excellent historians, some of who fought in the theater, Ambrose has created a fast-moving history from the ground level.  The cold, the thrill of the chase, the shock of retreat, the realization that the war is almost over and the fear of being the last man to die are brought home in a book that is difficult to put down.

Numerous other books have cast doubts on the fighting skills of the average U.S. soldier, especially in the infantry arm, especially in relation to his counterpart on the other side.  While Ambrose does not dispute that debate, he does not acknowledge it, instead focusing on the amazing ability of eighteen-year-old teenagers who served as privates and even officers to learn quickly how to survive during the terrible winter of 1944-45.  There is no doubt that thousands died due to poor training and an inability to master their weapons (young men trained as infantrymen were suddenly given a two-hour course on how to drive and use a tank with the result that in many instances, they did not last a day against the more professional German army).  Yet enough did to stop the German’s time and again and create the conditions for victory.

Ambrose does focus on the infantry as they are the sharp end of the bayonet, yet he also has chapters on the medics and nurses who provided the difference between life and death for literally tens of thousands of G.I.s who were wounded and rescued from the battle field and cared for by over worked nurses at the aid stations.  The relationship between the G.Is and those who treated them was one of mutual respect and admiration.

There are dark scenes and he discusses the execution of prisoners by Americans.  Some killings are done in the heat of battle, some are done coolie as a soldier is detailed to take prisoners back to battalion but somehow the prisoners never make it back.  How much killing of prisoners went on?  It is difficult to say, as only one veteran admitted to killing a prisoner, but hundreds “heard” of such actions.  Did the veterans condemn such actions?  Not to any great degree and the general impression from the book that such actions happen in war and that is that.

“As soon as A observes something which seems to him to be wrong, from which X is suffering, A talks it over with B, and A and B then propose to get a law passed to remedy the evil and help X.  Their law always proposes to determine what C shall do for X, or in the better case, what A, B and C shall do for X…What I want to do is to look up C.  I want to show you what manner of man he is.  I call him the Forgotten Man.  Perhaps the appellation is not strictly correct.  The is the man who never is thought of… He works, he votes, generally he pays-but he always pays…  William Graham Sumner, Yale University, 1883

Shales excellent book covers the period of the late Coolidge Presidency, through that of Hoover into the Roosevelt terms up to his defeat of Wilke.  We see these personalities but also many others who attempted to find solutions to the Great Depression while receiving conflicting messages and directives from President  Roosevelt.  Roosevelt was a crafty politician who kept everyone guessing as to which direction to go and which was the best policy to achieve his unclear goals.  This led to duplication of effort and mixed signals to those with whom he was attempting to achieve an agreement.  It was not unusual for Roosevelt to sent out two sets of negotiators with conflicting instructions and then even if an agreement were reached, he might reject it as it did not agree with some new idea of his.  This led, in the real world, to a hesitancy on the part of business to commit to long term planning as they were unsure of the next set of taxes, regulations, etc. and how they would impact them. This of course, let to reduced hiring and an extension of the Depression. Internationally, it led to a mistrust of U.S. policy.

The book provides an excellent overview of the battle the President had with the Supreme Court and they with his various new laws and governmental agencies.  To put those agencies and the growth of the Federal government in context and why the SC was viewed by FDR as obstructionist, within a few months of FDR’s first term, his new agencies had written more regulations than the entire U.S. government had written since the founding of the Republic.  The SC, struck down many of his rules and agencies. At his second inauguration, FDR stated that his goal was “unimagined power” which set him on a collision course with the SC.  FDR suffered a major defeat when he attempted to “pack” the SC in a political effort to control it (as we hear today from various politicians) yet in the end, due to retirements (the “four old men” on the Court were in their mid-seventies) and FDR was able to place Justices more in line with his political thinking.

FDR is remembered as a great President I believe for a couple of reasons;

1. His “We have nothing to fear, but fear itself” speech when he gave the American public hope for the future
2. His constant activity which made it appear that something constructive was being done for the American people (even though for example, he and his advisors realized that programs such as Social Security were unsustainable and would saddle future Presidents with a huge burden)

James Megellas was the most decorated officer in the 82^nd Airborne division in World War II.  He fought in Italy including at Anzio, took place in the invasion of Normandy, parachuted into Holland as part of the disaster of Market Garden and following the Battle of the Bulge took the long road through Germany all the way to Berlin.

Using letters, he had written during the war, interviews with former comrades, and excerpts from memoirs of men he served with from the ranks through to Generals he takes us on almost a day-by-day description of hundreds of days of combat.  He gives credit to those who served with him, writing of how being on the front lines for sixty days and longer, through all different types of weather, never bathing or shaving, the average American soldier fought and won against a long serving German army.

The citation for his Distinguished Service Cross (one step below the Congressional Medal of Honor) is as follows:

“First Lieutenant Megellas led his platoon on a combat patrol to secure information and prisoners.  Arriving at the enemy observation pose, he crawled forward alone and killed two outpost guards and the crew of a machine gun nest. He brought forward his patrol, attacked the mail enemy defenses and singlehandedly secured three prisoners and killed two more.  Two blockhouses were then attached and destroyed.  The aggressiveness of this patrol action thoroughly demoralized the enemy in the sector.  His mission completed, first Lieutenant Megellas withdrew his platoon through the enemy lines and under mortar fire.  He personally carried a wounded man while firing his Thompson submachine gun with one hand.  The extraordinary heroism and brilliant leadership displayed by First Lieutenant Megellas enabled his patrol to inflict disproportionate causalities on the enemy, secure vital information and force the Germans to abandon their planned offensive in the area.  His conduct was an inspiration to his men and a credit to the United States Airborne Forces.”

Aside from the DSC, he won two Silver Stars, two Bronze Stars with “V” and 2 Purple Hearts.  Forty years later a bill was introduced to upgrade one of his Silver Stars to the Congressional Medal of Honor based on the recommendation of his commanding officer, but the bill died in Congress. 

One of the highlights of the book is his description of the crossing of the Waal River during Operation Market Garden.  This dramatic and heroic assault against and entrenched and numerically superior enemy was one of the major battle scenes in the television series Band of Brothers.  Reading his description, one will feel as if they are not only in the assault boats, but you will also catch the feelings of the men before the assault.

I had a phone conversation with Mr. Megellas in 2006 (he died in 2020) after I read his book the first time.  His matter-of-fact descriptions reminded me of some of the writings of Ernst Junger in his classic Storm of Steel.  Unlike Junger, and despite his well-earned pride in his actions during the war, he did not see or feel a higher mystic feeling in the war.  As he said, “We realized the more Germans we killed, the faster we would get home.”

An excellent little book which reviews why various military air forces have failed since WWI. They cover the Imperial German and Russian air forces, the Polish air force of 1939, the French of 1933-40, Luftwaffe, Arab air forces, etc. Broken into short easy to read chapters, the common failures center around the following key factors:

• Lack of strategic vision
• Lack of logistics
• Inability to meet changing challenges
• Lack of governmental support in key areas

Some air forces started strong (Luftwaffe), some were the victims of national degeneracy (France), some the result of inability to deal with reality (Italy), but all went through a cycle of attempting to deal with forces beyond their control. Most of those forces were civilian, some were political, and most examples attempted to fulfill missions that were clearly beyond their means from any objective standpoint. While the pilots and mechanics did their best, the politicians simply failed to understand the weapon that they had at their disposal.

This little book is a quick informative read for anyone who wishes to understand the importance of logistics, strategy, tactics and will as they seek to come together to create a successful weapon.  The interesting thing that comes out is that no matter what has happened in the realm of military science, many are slow to recognize and learn from history. This book goes to prove a point that those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.

On a recent voyage, I had a discussion with some Brits about their history history.  The subject of Churchill came up and one elderly lady mentioned what a terrible job he had done with the Dardanelles during the First World War. I was surprised she held that view given the research, commissions, etc. that have been held since the war.  She must have gone through the school system or perhaps her parents belonged to the party which opposed Churchill for her view to be held so long after the fact.  I mentioned some counter information and she was genuinely surprised to hear the information I provided.  History is not dead, and it continues to shape our view of our world.

This brings us to this review of Churchill and the Dardanelles by Christopher M. Bell.  I was familiar with Bell as I had previously read his excellent book, Churchill and Sea Power and this book only goes to increase his reputation as an historian of note.

After the failure of the Dardanelles, there was much finger pointing as to would shoulder the blame for both the naval and army failures.  Was the campaign supported by the major players?  Did the Navy consult with the Army regarding joint action? Did the Navy go into the campaign with a full understanding of the Turkish defenses?  Who oversaw each operation?   The questions went on and on, but the initial blame landed on the desk of Churchill.  As a result, with all the politicians and military leaders running for cover, Churchill who was viewed as head-strong and much too pushy was left alone by most of his political allies.  He lost his position and was all but cast into a political wilderness.  Although the Prime Minister realized that Churchill was being sacrificed and that his skills would be helpful to the war effort, he was simply beyond the pale until tempers cooled down and a more objective analysis of the failures could be found.

Churchill immediately began to build his case for his political resurrection.  He gathered documents, spoke with is political allies and when a commission was formed to review the entire campaign, he labored hard and long for the ability to be actively involved not only to be in the commission but to also examine witnesses who were called.  Although he felt betrayed by Jackie Fisher who he had brought back to the naval board, they realized that they needed one another, and a temporary truce was called.  Numerous witnesses were called and after lengthy hearings, it was decided that Churchill came out with a much-improved position.

Churchill, however, was not one to rest and he took the entire episode to heart, becoming less naïve and careful to work to create his own image.  He used his political allies including the press to reconstruct and improve his image and the publication of his monumental work, The World Crisis in which he managed to paint his actions in the Dardanelles in a positive light while at the same time not burning any political bridges all but secured his resurrected reputation.

Although he would make political errors in the future (re: the Royal abdication, self-rule for India, etc.), he had learned that careful control of the press and public opinion could save him from his own errors.  Lord Birkenhead once commented, “When Winston is right, he is unique. When he is wrong-Oh My God!”.  Churchill knew that history would treat him well because he was determined to write it and write it, he did.  Yes, he made errors and could drive those around him to distraction, but in the end, his legend which he wrote was not that far off the mark.

Victor Davis Hanson in his The Father of Us All; War & History, Ancient & Modern gives due credit to The Age of Battles as one of the finest examples of military history as indeed it is. Since it was first published in 1991, Weigley gives a continual history of warfare, mostly in Western Europe, from Breitenfeld to Waterloo. Starting with the revolutionary tactics of Gustavus Adolphus and ending with the defeat of Napoleon, the author traces the continual quest for the “decisive battle” as a short cut to victory.

After the terrible bloodbath of the Thirty Years War, which left Germany devastated with millions of dead, it seemed as if Europe had made a conscious decision that warfare had to be restructured. One of the key steps to this process was Hugonis Grotius, the historical rules for the limitation of war were formalized. These rules were loosely going back to the rules of chivalry (which were never terribly effective) covered dealing with civilians, plunder, and more. Many rulers in Europe recognized that while war was not going to disappear, they could at least try to limit the overall damage. It was amazing that with the rise of nation states and greater concentration of power and wealth, those who ruled suddenly realized that they had a personal stake in limiting wars which could be dangerous to their position and existence.

The military revolution went hand in hand with the greater solidification of centralized power. Gustavus Adolphus the leader of a small and poor European state (Sweden) realized that he had to take his disadvantage and turn it into a positive. The result was a small, highly trained, well disciplined, well fed and amazingly for the time, one that was paid on time. The result was an outstanding force of cavalry (changed and trained on Sweden’s wartime experiences in Poland) backed by a solid infantry trained on shock tactics. For example, the traditional cavalry tactic with the introduction of pistols was for the cavalry to charge the enemy, then stop and fire a volley and retreat. The effect as normally poor, as attempting to accurately wield a primitive pistol which was not only inaccurate but of small penetrating power hardly seemed worth the effort. Adolphus remembering the shock impact of the heavy Polish cavalry trained his cavalry to smash into the enemy formations, break then and then allow the infantry to finish the battle. For a while, he was the terror of Europe, but he ran into problems which he had not foreseen, such as the rise of the centralized state (or other kingdoms) which were larger and wealthier.

Therein lay the rub; how could a general win a war by scoring a decisive battle when the enemy was able how to tap into its own military advantages, such as manpower and wealth. Famously, Louis XIV restructured his system of taxation, developed a competent bureaucracy, and hired some of the best officers in Europe. The result was a dramatic increase in the size of the French military and in the professionalism of the military. Standard uniforms, drills, command structures, etc. all went to create a military that began to move like a machine instead of a mob. In particular, the French army the innovations in artillery made many of the old defensive infantry tactics an invitation to slaughter. Finally, instead of an army numbering ten or fifteen thousand, the French army expanded to number hundreds of thousands. How was a small state like Sweden to compete with power like that?

Unlike many military historians, the author manages to blend the personalities, goals and most importantly, innovations which led to each leader or generals’ temporary success on the battlefield. He also shows how the development of a professional military sped up the development of the industries necessary for it’s being.

He ends the book with the battle of Waterloo, where Napoleon, short of cavalry, surrounded by generals who were past their prime (as was he), head of an army from a nation which had already suffered a million dead from his reign was defeated by an polyglot army made up of, for the most part, traditionally second rate infantry but held together by Wellington who had nothing but distain for the average soldier. Although future generals and admirals would dream of a “decisive battle,” the time for any chance of such a battle has long passed. The modern state is too diverse with too many resources to disappear due to one loss, no matter how great. We have seen during the twentieth century how far the state will go and how much of its population it will sacrifice to survive.

This is the third time I have read the book and each time I have found the book stimulating and a reminder of the skills needed by successful leaders not only in the military, but in business or any endeavor where much is at stake. The ability to adapt and innovate is the one constant lesson to be learned from this work.

From July 1942 until the end of the war, Sepp Allerberger was a sniper fighting against the Soviet Union.  During that time, his official tally of 257 confirmed kills, made him the second most deadly sniper in the German Army (the record of 345 kills was held by Mathias Hetzenauer).  It is important to note that a sniper “kill” had to meet certain requirements, such as it had to be done during an actual sniper assignment (ordinary defensive or offensive kills are not counted) and must be confirmed by either an officer or an NCO.  Allerberger states only that his individual kills, taking unconfirmed sniper kills was much higher. 

Allerberger did not come from a military family; his home was a small village on the Austrian side of the Bavarian Alps near Salzburg.  He was drafted at the age of eighteen and trained as a machine gunner.  After his first battle, he realized that he was a marked man for machine gunners were prime targets of the enemy.  He decided to try for a safer job and accidently found out that he was an excellent shot.  As the German Army was behind the Soviet in the development and training of snipers, it was a “learn as you go” decision.  He quickly learned the trade and was highly valued at the front where many assignments were to kill his Soviet counterpart who was causing losses in his vicinity.  Sniper to sniper battles pit individual skill, patience, and determination at the personal level and yet Allerberger does not exhibit any emotion other than pride for his victories.

As noted, all kills had to be confirmed and that could be a problem as many in the German Army felt that being a sniper was a “dirty” job.  Hiding, sneaking up on the enemy, killing when ever possible, including when a soldier is going to the bathroom carried a bad odor.  This view extended to the artillery officers who somehow believed throwing a high explosive shell miles at an unseen and unsuspecting enemy was more “honest”.  For the infantry, enemy snipers were hated thought to fight dirty, but their own snipers were well liked and protected.  War has its own value system.

Given that many snipers were killed after 15-20 shots, his score is amazing.  He seemed to lead a charmed life, receiving no major wounds, and suffered only minor scratches.  His detailed descriptions of many encounters are excellent, and one clearly see the barbarity of warfare on the Eastern Front. 

His story brings to light the mentality of an army in retreat. Months of constant retreat and serious losses in manpower and equipment left the average soldier demoralized, dirty, hungry and constantly looking over their shoulders at the Russians who seemed to have unlimited resources. During the retreats, seriously wounded men were left behind even though everyone knew that the oncoming Russians would at best, quickly kill them or more likely, torture them before killing them. One has to remember that the Russians were not only out for victory, but also for revenge for the deeds of the Germans on their homes and loved ones. It was a war with little or more mercy. Often, the Russians had more to fear from their own officers who subjected them to beatings, penal battalions and early on in the war, cases of cannibalism.

This is only the third book I have read by a veteran which reflects a certain mindset.  Ernst Junger’s Storm of Steel is one example, another is by an American, James Megellas’s All the Way to Berlin. Reading their stories, one sees an individual who calmly picks up a weapon, kills will great proficiency and then afterwards, go on to lead a normal life. They offer a fascinating view of war by very uncommon men.

Siberia after it was conquered by the Russian Empire, was consider a land of huge wealth, from the priceless furs (a single Ermine pelt was enough to buy a good farm in Russia) to timber and gold, it was also known as the world’s largest prison without a roof.  A land where landless free peasants to go to in order to escape the tyranny of the Tsars and to build a new life, it also served as a great dumping ground for all manner of criminals, both political and non-political (one could be sent to Siberia for life long exile for being a vagrant).  As the population of Russia grew, and the central government could not provide the services for the population, Siberia became a way for lazy local officials to get rid of those they considered problematic.

The journey to Siberia until the advent of the Trans-Siberian railway was most on foot.  Imagine walking, 6 days out of 7, week in, week out, in the Siberian summer and winter for one to two years just to reach your place of exile.  And, your term of punishment did not begin until you completed that journey.  During that journey you were, unless supported by your family who could provide you funds, at the mercy and budget of the prison system which provided a minimum of food and clothing both during the trek and at your place of exile.  The system was so terrible, that some male prisoners would often write their wives telling them to sell everything and come to Siberia where the government was providing each prisoner with land, a cow, horse, house and funds.  In reality, nothing was provided and when the wife arrived with children in hand, their husbands would sell them all into prostitution in order to get enough money to live.

After the term of punishment was completed, as the theory went, the ex-prisoners who had been taught discipline and hard work, would stay in Siberia and begin new farms which would colonize the vast land.  In reality, the prisoners had been so brutalized by the guards, other prisoners and hard labor, that they turned to the only things they had really learned in exile; stealing, forgery, murder, etc.  The large numbers of former prisoners would often wander in bands, laying siege to individual farms and even smaller villages and towns.