Hannah Arendt, the noted political theorist and philosopher was on the receiving end of her fellow Jewish intellectual’s fury when she coined the phrase,” banality of evil” to describe Adolf Eichman. The question was asked, “How could she use such a phrase to describe those who had been responsible for the murder of six-million Jews? Surely those men were monsters, outside the norm of humanity.”  Yet she did not make that statement in a vacuum, but rather after covering the trial of Adolf Eichmann for The New Yorker magazine. Friends and compatriots turned on her as she even dared to suggest that some Jews made the work of the Nazi’s easier by co-operating with the Nazis.

In The Good Old Days, we investigate the letters home, photo albus, confidential reports and diaries of those involved in mass murders. The title is drawn from a caption in a photo album belonging to the last commander of Treblinka. During its operation, it was visited by a professor of medicine who “was appalled” by what he saw, yet in his diary he notes the excellent food and “first-rate vanilla ice cream.”  This was only one of many references from the letters and diaries of others including ordinary policy battalions (there were about one hundred fifty such battalions). The police battalions contained ordinary police officers which were formed to “police” the rear areas of Eastern Front. Shipped to the East with no special training, they were  instructed to proceed with the murder of mostly Jews in the occupied territories. On the site they were instructed as to the types and depth of the trenches where the victims were led, the order of execution, and so forth. As time went on, the men became more proficient and were able to conduct the executions much more quickly.

How did the men of the police battalions react to their commanding officers’ instructions for their first mass killing? Most of the men went along with and followed the instructions although the commanders made it truly clear that if any individual felt they could not comply, there would be no serious repercussions. A few, very few accepted the offer and were normally given kitchen duties or placed in charge of the latrines. Those few might be subject to comments from the rest of the battalion and a few of the dissenters would eventually relent and join their comrades in the killing.

Throughout the book, one is aware of the banality of the men. They complained about their sore feet, wrote home about “items” they picked up while doing their duty, noted especially tasty food, and longed for the day when they could return to their police duties back home. Some felt that they were doing a great service to mankind, but few would qualify as sadistic in the sense that they took pride in taking clean shots in order to minimize the suffering of the killed. At the same time, the drivers of the gas vans were responsible for cleaning the vans of blood, feces, hair, etc. and seemed to have seen it as another necessary if dirty job.

If one is looking for some special glimpse into the psyche of mass murderers, one will be disappointed by this book. In fact, it goes a long way to confirm Hannah Arendt’s phrase and observation. After the war, out of the one hundred and fifty battalions (up to 75,000 men), only a handful were convicted of war crimes. Most members when back to their old jobs, to their old towns and lived ordinary lives. Reunions were well attended and in their own way, celebrated the good old days.

History is full of “what ifs”, “near things”, and “almost”.  In Hitler’s American Gamble by Brendan Simms and Charlie Laderman, the authors discuss the various scenarios had Hitler not declared war on the United States after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

What makes this book more interesting than one would expect is that the authors follow the fears, thoughts, actions and discussions of the Roosevelt, Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Churchill, and various Japanese officials on a day-to-day basis from December 7^th until the German declaration of war on December 11^th.  They point out that serious questions were raised during that four-day period and that contrary to popular history, it was an agonizing time for Churchill.  While he may have been buoyant to those around him, he had numerous concerns about the actions the Americans might take and how it would impact the British.

For four days, Axis, Soviet and British leaders held their breath and pondered the American course.  Concerns included:

1. Would the U.S. begin to scale back Lend Lease support to the U.K. and the Soviets to rearm themselves against the Japanese?
2. If they did, by how much and would that help the Germans at a time when the U.K. especially were just handing on in the Battle of the Atlantic, North Africa, etc.?
3. As Roosevelt only called for a declaration of war against Japan, and with a seriously damaged U.S. navy, would support in the Battle of the Atlantic be scaled back?
4. For the Japanese, their concern was whether Hitler would honor his pledge to declare war on the U.S. and thus force the U.S. to divert some of its immense industrial strength away from Japan and towards Germany.
5. With the sinking of the British warships Repulse and Prince of Wales, not only Singapore but also Australia was in grave danger and the British were fearful of a Japanese thrust into the Indian Ocean towards India.
6. Roosevelt believed Germany to be the greater threat but how to enter the war against Germany when most Americans were either isolationist or calling for revenge against Japan?
7. Aware of the industrial might of the U.S., Hitler knew that sooner or later Germany and the U.S. would fight one another directly, so was it better to declare war now when Japan could divert some of the U.S. strength or stay out of the war and force Roosevelt to zero in on Japan?
8. For the Soviets, who had a non-aggression pact with Japan, would the U.S. cut back on the munitions, supplies, trucks, food, etc., that was vital to keeping the Soviets in the war and would Japan break its pact with the Soviets and attack, creating a two-front war for Stalin?
9. Churchill knew that without increased U.S. aid, he would have to cut back military aid to Stalin to stay in the battle with Germany.  If the U.S. did not declare war on Germany, the future for the Empire was bleak at best.

Fortunately for the world, on December 11^th, Hitler honored his pact and declared war on the United States.  Now Churchill fully believed that the war was won as the U.S. was fully committed to a world war.  Hitler still believed that he had the time build from his European conquests the industrial might to counter the eventual direct struggle with the U.S. and that it was better to begin the fight now rather than wait until the fully industrial might of the U.S. could be brought to bare on Germany.  For Japan, who managed to seriously underestimate the potential might of the U.S., they believed that they could create the defensive zones and exploit the areas they had so easily conquered. And, for Stalin, he had proof that Japan would focus on the U.S. and the danger of a second front was avoided.

In some ways, this book reads like a novel in that the day-to-day questions, routines, discussions, etc. of various leaders takes the reader into the mindset of leaders on a day-to-day basis.  It is an excellent history both for someone who seeks to capture the days and for more advanced amateur historians as a fine reference point. 

French President Charles de Gaulle once said, “The State is a harsh mistress”.  He may have said that thinking about the French members of the long-range recon groups who were left behind to wither and die as France left Viet Nam.  Living with the locals, fighting without resupply against the Viet Minh who were relentless in hunting them down, they pleas and curses asking for support finally tapered off as the last were killed in unknown and unremembered hills and valleys.

So, it was after the Allied victory of World War II.  Former enemies, including known war criminals were suddenly provided shelter, jobs, and safety in many of the victorious nations.  The United States, Canada, France, the Soviet Union all began to recruit German scientists as the new lines of the Cold War were being drawn.  Much of the recruiting was done secretly in the United States by military officers who were concerned that the new missile technology and secrets of biological warfare could not be left to the Soviets who, aside from plundering a conquered Germany, was abducting every scientist they could find. 

In Operation Paperclip, Jacobsen provides a detailed history of the various forces who struggled with the physical and moral choices which had to be faced.  There were those who believed that having defeated the Nazi war machine, that enlisting the scientists who worked on missiles, nerve/poison gasses and who had in fact committed war crimes was beyond the pale for the U.S.  Others viewed the victorious Soviet Union as the next great enemy, once which had shown that the difference between them and Nazi Germany was at best, minimal.  It was a time of moral questioning and a time of future planning.

Infighting between the CIA, the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department, and the FBI continued for years with the CIA showing its ability to operate outside of normal channels and continue to pursue its own policies. Some of the arguments against the use of German scientist were moral, as is today arguments of using medical results from the doctors at the concentration camps.  Some were political as a growing Germany resented their best scientist being employed by other nations.  In the end, thanks to the space race, reality won the day as the competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union became hardened.

This is not only a history, but also a morality play, one which could have been used when ethics classes were not so political.  It is well written, and it would be easy to understand how the reader could have a difficult time balancing the morality of the program vs. the fears and beliefs of those years.  Indeed, the State is a harsh mistress.

 I seldom read any books on WWII any longer (as my library is chuck full of WWII histories and little that is new is published except for information provided by the opening of the Soviet archives in the early 1990’s), but this book caught my attention as it was reviewed as facing the question of the average German’s knowledge of the mass killings in the East.

From the Nuremburg Trials to the last 1980’s, Reitlinger’s The SS; Alibi of a Nation, shifted the blame and knowledge of mass murder to the SS, both front line and those SS in the concentration camps.  It did not matter that many SS were drafted from the navy or army or even the air force late in the war, those veterans were all branded as the ones to blame for all the crimes of Hitler’s Germany.

In the late 1980s, a new generation of academics and historians came out with important books such as Omer Bartov’s Hitler’s Army, Riess’s The Good Old Days, Ordinary Men  by Christopher Browning and even The Nazi Conscience by Claudia Koonz, in which the participation and knowledge of the murders became more widespread among the wider German nation during the period of 1939-45. 

Stargardt’s book, while not revolutionary (to anyone with basic knowledge of the period and subject), is interesting in that he lays out the argument that the combination of soldier’s letters home, amateur films taken by the troops at the locations where mass executions were taking place and soldiers stories while on home leave gave ample knowledge of the murders to the civilians on the home front. Further proof is offered as civilians, under increasing Allied bombing, stated that it was a reprisal for all that had been done to the Jews, while even as the Jews were expelled from Germany, Nazi propaganda blamed the Jewish worldwide conspiracy for the bombings and went on to exclaim that the war would only end up with the extermination of the Jews.

Near the end of the book (and the war), one can feel the desperation and hopelessness of the Germans as their illusions of miracle weapons evaporate and the realization that the war is lost; the sacrifice and work was for naught and the German’s came to see themselves as victims not only of the Allied bombing, but of a failed Nazi leadership (but they still retained faith in Hitler until he betrayed them by committing suicide).

A good book, well documented, a good read and I would recommend it to anyone interested in a concise history of the period.

One of the great battles of World War II, Stalingrad consumed the lives of an estimated 1,000,000 men on both sides.  The stories of human suffering, and bravery, of lost illusions and shattered idealism are legion and yet we seldom really can understand the pain of the men involved in epic battles.

When you think of it, the concept of men fighting in sub-zero temperatures, with little or no shelter, for months on end with little food, who are shelled, outgunned and faced by a foe who is both vengeful and afraid is unknowable to we who read about the battles.  But Gerlach, who fought at Stalingrad and was one of the few (5000 out of 91,000 captured), did manage to survive and create a story woven from the experiences of other Germans who were captured. 

What few people realize is that the fighting was to a large extent, carried on by the few frontline troops who had to face the guns, tanks and cold alone on a windswept steppe.  Tens of thousands of other Germans were the support troops who lived in the ruins of the city in basements, shattered rooms and dug outs which provided them with a level of protection and comfort that was unknown to the frontline soldiers.  These support troops stayed behind the lines until late in the battle when some of them were placed into special “assault” battalions; untrained in combat, they were simple cannon fodder, thrown into the breach and accomplished little other than to die for the Fuehrer.

The unsung heroes of the battle were the doctors and orderlies who tried to perform miracles for the wounded.  Tired and overworked, lacking pain killers, clean bandages, even a warm room from which to work, they spent long hours cutting, stitching and battling to save lives.  And yet, even if they were successful in their operations, the wounded most likely faced little food, no heat and unsanitary conditions as they were lined up by the hundreds in basements or even outside to suffer and freeze.  The images of wagon loads of wounded men, slowly freezing to death because there was simply no more room for them in the pathetic shelters will make any reader realize how terrible and pitiless war is to the participants.

Gerlach has created an excellent history of a battle, seen from men at the point of danger.  No sweeping scenes of mass movements of men, no brave words to stir one’s heart, this novel brings war down to its lowest level; the men in the trenches whose only knowledge of the war and battle is as far as they can see.

An excellent little book which reviews why various military air forces have failed since WWI. They cover the Imperial German and Russian air forces, the Polish air force of 1939, the French of 1933-40, Luftwaffe, Arab air forces, etc. Broken into short easy to read chapters, the common failures center around the following key factors:

• Lack of strategic vision
• Lack of logistics
• Inability to meet changing challenges
• Lack of governmental support in key areas

Some air forces started strong (Luftwaffe), some were the victims of national degeneracy (France), some the result of inability to deal with reality (Italy), but all went through a cycle of attempting to deal with forces beyond their control. Most of those forces were civilian, some were political, and most examples attempted to fulfill missions that were clearly beyond their means from any objective standpoint. While the pilots and mechanics did their best, the politicians simply failed to understand the weapon that they had at their disposal.

This little book is a quick informative read for anyone who wishes to understand the importance of logistics, strategy, tactics and will as they seek to come together to create a successful weapon.  The interesting thing that comes out is that no matter what has happened in the realm of military science, many are slow to recognize and learn from history. This book goes to prove a point that those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.

From July 1942 until the end of the war, Sepp Allerberger was a sniper fighting against the Soviet Union.  During that time, his official tally of 257 confirmed kills, made him the second most deadly sniper in the German Army (the record of 345 kills was held by Mathias Hetzenauer).  It is important to note that a sniper “kill” had to meet certain requirements, such as it had to be done during an actual sniper assignment (ordinary defensive or offensive kills are not counted) and must be confirmed by either an officer or an NCO.  Allerberger states only that his individual kills, taking unconfirmed sniper kills was much higher. 

Allerberger did not come from a military family; his home was a small village on the Austrian side of the Bavarian Alps near Salzburg.  He was drafted at the age of eighteen and trained as a machine gunner.  After his first battle, he realized that he was a marked man for machine gunners were prime targets of the enemy.  He decided to try for a safer job and accidently found out that he was an excellent shot.  As the German Army was behind the Soviet in the development and training of snipers, it was a “learn as you go” decision.  He quickly learned the trade and was highly valued at the front where many assignments were to kill his Soviet counterpart who was causing losses in his vicinity.  Sniper to sniper battles pit individual skill, patience, and determination at the personal level and yet Allerberger does not exhibit any emotion other than pride for his victories.

As noted, all kills had to be confirmed and that could be a problem as many in the German Army felt that being a sniper was a “dirty” job.  Hiding, sneaking up on the enemy, killing when ever possible, including when a soldier is going to the bathroom carried a bad odor.  This view extended to the artillery officers who somehow believed throwing a high explosive shell miles at an unseen and unsuspecting enemy was more “honest”.  For the infantry, enemy snipers were hated thought to fight dirty, but their own snipers were well liked and protected.  War has its own value system.

Given that many snipers were killed after 15-20 shots, his score is amazing.  He seemed to lead a charmed life, receiving no major wounds, and suffered only minor scratches.  His detailed descriptions of many encounters are excellent, and one clearly see the barbarity of warfare on the Eastern Front. 

His story brings to light the mentality of an army in retreat. Months of constant retreat and serious losses in manpower and equipment left the average soldier demoralized, dirty, hungry and constantly looking over their shoulders at the Russians who seemed to have unlimited resources. During the retreats, seriously wounded men were left behind even though everyone knew that the oncoming Russians would at best, quickly kill them or more likely, torture them before killing them. One has to remember that the Russians were not only out for victory, but also for revenge for the deeds of the Germans on their homes and loved ones. It was a war with little or more mercy. Often, the Russians had more to fear from their own officers who subjected them to beatings, penal battalions and early on in the war, cases of cannibalism.

This is only the third book I have read by a veteran which reflects a certain mindset.  Ernst Junger’s Storm of Steel is one example, another is by an American, James Megellas’s All the Way to Berlin. Reading their stories, one sees an individual who calmly picks up a weapon, kills will great proficiency and then afterwards, go on to lead a normal life. They offer a fascinating view of war by very uncommon men.

There certainly is no shortage of World War II histories, most of which cover the various campaigns around the world.  There are also some excellent histories which cover the logistics of the war, arguing first one way then the other about when the window of opportunity for Germany closed and the tide turned forever against the Axis powers.

While the military side of the war is covered in this book, the main emphasis is rather on the average German and their shifting outlook during the war.  This includes the treatment of Jews and how much the average German knew about the treatment of the Jews in the East, the camps, etc. If they were willing to listen the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) or SS Security Service which was formed in the early 1930s but organized and given new powers when commanded by Reinhard Heydrich provided accurate information on the state of mind of the German people.  That information advised Nazi leaders such as Goebbels when attack the Jews and when to throttle back those attacks and instead focus on some other aspect of the war.  The SD noted the reaction to Goebbels call for Total War which ignited the crowd where he spoke but which was thought to be staged by many listeners.

Throughout the book, the average Germans views on the treatment of the Jews (and other “lesser” peoples), is viewed through the millions of letters, photographs and camera footage shot by the common German soldier and sent home.  The idea that the home front did not have any idea of the mass executions in the East is difficult to sustain given the volume of the information which was provided by the soldiers and freely provided to their families.  Although some letters attempted to shield the civilian (normally a wife or other loved one) from the brutality of the killing by saying that the writer does not want to shock the reader too much, it is clear that mass killings were witnessed. 

No history of the time would not be complete without information on the bombing of the German cities.  Germany, unlike Italy, had a complex and well organized system to maintain production and provide for those who were bombed out of their homes.  In order to maintain morale during the bombing, over fifty-thousand anti-aircraft guns were deployed and those guns devoured about a third of all artillery production at a time when the troops in the field were heavily outgunned.  For those who lost their houses, furniture, clothing, and other household basics were provided by the loot taken from the German Jews. This did lead to instances where the new German owners complained that the loot was either too big, of poor quality or not maintained correctly. As the bombing campaign continued to build, it was not unusual to hear that it is a Jewish payback for how the German Jews had been treated.

One strong aspect of this volume is the use of correspondence between the soldiers and those at home.  They bring an excellent personal touch to the book and when the correspondence from the front stops (such as one correspondence where the writer is at Stalingrad), it brings the pity of war that much closer.

This is an excellent book for anyone to see both sides (campaign and home front) in a single well-written and researched history.

During World War II, an Italian Senator who was forced to resign his post by Mussolini. This was the man who in 1925 published his three-volume work on the causes of the First World War.  At 2280 pages, Senator Albertini provides the serious student of history with a detailed, inside glimpse at European power politics reaching back into the mid 19^th century.  In these volumes he exposes to the light of day the most minute diplomatic dispatches as well as his own personal discussions with many of the diplomats who had key roles in the lead up to the First World War. 

Reading diplomatic dispatches, letters and notes is never fascinating in the best of times, and with the distance of time, it is often difficult to remember or place correctly the individual players.  German Foreign Ministers of the Kaiser come and go; diplomats of the Czar long forgotten are suddenly brought back to light and the internal wrangling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire between the pro-German factions and the landed Magyars who are at direct logger heads with the Austrian Foreign office can be mind numbing. Added to the pile of information are the even more obscure Italian officials who want so badly to be taken seriously by the “great” European powers and are generally scorned, mistrusted and pushed aside and you have a web of intrigue that is difficult to follow without copious notes or a mind trained to a unusually high level of boredom.

            Yet the volumes can also at times read like a great mystery tale, but one in which you know the outcome and which, at times, you want at times to reach back in time to throttle, berate and besiege the players so that the terrible bloody outcome can somehow be avoided. At times you begin to see the engine of history moving forward, picking up speed and moving in what seems to be an unstoppable manner to the conclusion which chewed up the lives, future, and fortune of so many tens of millions of individuals.  At times you must put the book down as you shake your head with the knowledge of future events which seem so clear nearly a hundred years later, but which were so shrouded at the time.  The book can be infuriating and at times you hope there is a God with a sense of Justice, with a capital “J”.  You hope there truly is a day of reckoning for so many individuals, such as:

Bloodlands, Timothy Snyder’s monumental work has been complimented by Black Earth, The Holocaust as History and Warning. I must admit that I was initially put from this book due to numerous reviews which seemed to focus on one small portion of this work, that of trying to link the lessons of the Holocaust to climate change.  Such a premise held no interest to me as the horrors documented in Bloodlands was the result of conscious decisions by political systems which denied the basic humanity of mankind, whereas the arguments re: climate change are open to sloppy science at the worse as well as subject to hyperbole (we only have twelve years left) which undercut the actual science.

Given the reviews, rather than purchase the book as I would do with any Snyder book, I found it during a cruise in the ship’s library. I was wonderfully surprised that ninety-eight percent of the book was an excellent historical work which consolidated and exposed many forgotten historical facts as well as providing a key analysis between the goals and policies of Hitler’s Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union not only leading up to the Holocaust but also the misconceptions of those three powers and how they impacted the course of history.

For years, Hitler’s Germany attempted to woo Poland into an alliance which would result in a joint German-Polish invasion of the Soviet Union; the goal was the fulfillment of Hitler’s dream of Lebensraum but also (as the Poles realized) making Poland a client state of Germany.  For Stalin, the eliminate of Poland was key, in large part due to the Soviet’s defeat by the Poles in 1921 and Stalin’s part in the defeat, and to create a bigger buffer against Germany.  For the Poles, caught between two more powerful neighbors, the key was to play one off against the other by having non-aggression pacts with both Germany and the Soviet Union.