Bloodlands, his 2010 history of Eastern Europe, Timothy Snyder presented a graphic picture of the continual wars, revolutions and famines which has plagued Ukraine and surrounding lands. We have seen for over two years with the Russian invasion of Ukraine more heartless killing and terror. In Prit Buttar’s Retribution we witness a merciless war of attrition between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as the Soviets drive to recapture an area which was overrun in 1941 and which suffered under the Nazi regime.

This is a detailed military book of that campaign which totally ignores the suffering of the local population. Caught between two gigantic military forces, we can only image the terrible cost that the locals faced when thousands of tanks, airplanes and hundreds of thousands of men on both sides fought in a no mercy military campaign driven and directed by military and political commanders who gave little if any thought to their own troops, let alone the civilians.

In a book of nearly five hundred pages, there are numerous eyewitness accounts by soldiers and field grade officers (most of them from the German side) which can very well lead the reader to exhaustion after only a few pages. The fighting was so brutal and unrelenting that it makes the battles of attrition of World War One almost seem to be less horrific than they were. Why? Because which World War One introduced the war between machines which replaced the wars between men, the leap in technology and lethality of the means of killing had exploded exponentially. Although the German army still had a slight professional edge, the Soviets had learned well from the Germans and had increased their ability to adapt and foresee the German defensive moves. Yes, the Soviets still used on many occasions the blunt force of superior numbers in both men and material, but the constant drain of experienced German officers, NCOs and material, though endless battles deprived the average German soldier of any hope of relief let alone victory.

The individual German tank crews were still, tank for tank and man for man, superior to the average Soviet tank crew, but as would be the case in Western Europe in the next year, the Soviets like the Americans were willing to lost three or four tanks in order to kill one German tank.  The Soviets outproduced German production by a ratio of two, three and even four to one, and while the Soviets could concentrate their efforts in one continuous theater, the Germans had to spread their production and manpower over several theaters.

Was the reconquest of Central Ukraine a forgone conclusion? Nothing is ever guaranteed in war, but nothing short of a miracle could stop the Soviets. The mistakes of the Germans earlier in the war such as not knocking out England, or their defeat in North Africa, even the German declaration of war on the United States all came home to be paid in this campaign. The Germans decided to fight the world knowing that time was not on their side. When they committed serious errors which upset their timetable, they faced the reality they created.

The shame of it all is that we see another war of attrition in the same area today. Once again, the average person will pay the price for a tyrant’s illusions.

Prior to World War II, the established bureaucracy within the U.S. navy felt that battleships would decide victory or defeat in any ocean-based war. During the war, it was realized that it was not battleships which were the deciding factor, but the aircraft carriers and hence, a new bureaucracy displaced the old.  There was another weapon which created its own set of followers and that was the submarine.  It was the submarine in the Pacific that accomplished what the U-boats could not achieve in the Atlantic; the destruction of the Japanese to transport the basic materials they needed to conduct a war.  The U.S. submarine fleet destroyed the Japanese merchant fleet which carried the oil, wood, coal, foodstuffs and all the other ingredients upon which Japan depended.

The submarine officers were a different breed apart from the officers on carriers and other surface vessels.  They were so different in fact, that officers who served in submarines knew they did not have a chance to access the highest ranks in the navy.  They were considered mavericks, risk takers and prone to striking out on their own.  They readily admitted these characteristics but then their service was entirely different from the rest of the navy.  A surface vessel can have engine problems and get towed, but if a submarine has major engine problems, it sinks.

Against this backdrop of two entrenched bureaucracies, each attempting to snare more dollars in the military budget, comes Hyman Rickover, a man of Jewish background, born in Russian occupied Poland in 1900 who has chosen to make engineering as his course in the Navy.  Talk about handicapping! As with sub officers, an engineering officer realized that getting a shot at Admiral status was small.  Not only those black marks, but he also becomes the driving force behind creating a force of nuclear submarines while disdaining the sub captains who came out of WWII with honors and medals.  Yet somehow, despite all odds, he manages to defeat much of the naval bureaucracy, convince powerful Congressional leaders and several President’s to create a nuclear submarine force that although smaller than the Soviet fleet, was technologically far ahead of the Soviets.

According to Marxist “scientific thought”, man is shaped by his environment; change the environment and you can create a “New Man”.  The same belief applies to plants and animals.  Thus, it was that while the Soviet Union spent more on scientific research than any other nation, they also managed to produce some of the worse examples of what we would call “junk science”. 

Part of the problem was that it was believed that the masses which were held down by the forces of reaction, exploitation, etc., contained within them the seeds of greatness.  Thus, it was possible for a poorly educated individual like Trofim Denisovich Lysenko and others of his ilk to make fantastic claims of break throughs in agriculture and dominate the Soviet scientific community.  With the right backing (Stalin), Lysenko, who denied the existence of genes, kept many of the older, traditionally educated scientists in a scientific limbo.  They were forced to work secretly in small poorly equipped labs while millions of rubles and huge tracks of land were given over to dubious experiments and the results doctored to fit “Marxist scientific” thought.  Attempts were made to grow lemon trees above the artic circle, millions of trees were planted in arid waste lands in an attempt to change the environment (the trees all died from lack of water, brutal winters or scorching summers), etc.  Foreign species were introduced into areas where the wolves had been killed off with the result that those populations greatly expanded by they passed along their diseases to the local domestic cattle which caused a great death toll and thus shortage of beef in the country.  There was even a theory that apes could be used to inseminate women to create a new race.

During World War II, in the face of national disaster, the strict guidelines of adhering to Marxist theory was relaxed with the result that a newly educated generation of scientists were allowed more freedom.  The results were staggering as break throughs not only in weapon development, but also in agriculture and genetic research helped to save the State.  After the war however, many scientists were forced to adhere more closely to the pre-war scientific theories.  This included theory related to such fields as psychoanalysis, social psychology or individual psychology (Pavlov had not ventured into these areas, so research was not considered necessary).  The only psychologic theory that seemed to hold any sway was that anyone who did not adhere to Soviet thought must be schizophrenic.

While there was hope for greater freedom after Stalin’s death, the agricultural experiments and failures under Khrushchev were examples of the continuation of the continued life of the theories of Lysenko.  To this day, Russian agriculture continues to suffer for the errors of previous times.  The amazing thing is that even under the warped science theories of the time, there were positive break throughs which have been beneficial to the scientific and non-scientific worlds. 

This book is one great story of political correctness in the scientific world at that time and should serve as a warning to all of us, both scientist and non-scientist of the dangers of the concept of “settled science”, a frightening term if ever one existed.

Who were the financiers who provided the manufacturing and technical expertise which allowing Hitler and the Nazis to overrun so much of Europe and commit the Holocaust?  And, after the war, what actions if any were taken against them not only for their material support of Hitler, but also for the use of slave labor on a scale not seen since the Roman Empire?

Mr. De Jong spent four years researching this book focusing on four major German families; the Quandts, the Flicks, the von Fincks and the Porsche-Piechs.  How is it that the Krupps are so well known and yet these families contributed in so many ways to the Nazi war machine, producing tanks, guns of every caliber, ammunition, drugs, medicines and almost every other item that a nation needs for war.

Some of the named above were successful industrialists before Hitler’s rise to power, such as the Quandts while other took advantage of the “Aryanization” of Jewish businesses.  “Aryanization” was the concept that with the introduction of the Nuremberg Laws, Jews were forbidden to own factories and businesses.  In order to comply with the law, Jewish businesses were “bought out” by Germans for pennies on the dollar and then those few pennies were determined to be the cost of an exit visa from Germany as many of the Jews fled to other countries. Such theft was in itself a crime that these and other families committed but add to the list the inhuman treatment of the slave laborers and the wheels of justice should have centered on these families.  Why weren’t these families the targets of justice?

Through the mists of time, the campaign against Poland in September 1939 has seemed to have almost disappeared.  Memoirs and campaign histories of other actions of World War II have stuffed libraries around the world to overflowing and even today new volumes are produced which seldom contribute something new to our understanding of these events.  Aside from an occasional article in a history magazine, about the most complete history of the campaign that I found was by Major Robert M. Kennedy as published by the Department of the U.S. Army (1956).  Roger Moorhouse’s new book promised to bring some new facts to bare, especially around personal narrative from the Polish defenders.  To some extent, this has been achieved.

I say to some extent as there are some actions where the thoughts and activities of the defenders are noted, but not as many as I personally would have enjoyed.  The strength of this book is in putting the lead up to the war in good context, especially in the alliance between the U.K., France, and Poland.  To be brutally truthful, Poland was betrayed by its allies, who promised aid and an offensive against the Germans but had no intention or desire; instead the “allies” of Poland were depending on bluff to stop the Germans. Just two days before the invasion, when the German army was deployed on three sides of Poland, the French Minister of War assured his Polish counter parts that France was fully committed to invading Germany with the full might of its military if war were to begin.  Of course, the French “offensive” thrust a few kilometers into Germany and then quickly pulled back, while the British did not begin a bombing offensive as “private property” might be damaged.

The Polish defense of Westerplatte is covered well, but other actions such as those on the Hel peninsula and at the fortress of Modlin are barely touched.  The famous cavalry actions of Poland’s Uhlans are put into proper perspective and the Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland are also covered adequately.  Other weaknesses include not discussing the escaped of over 100,000 Polish troops through Romania and their contribution to the allied victory (as well as their betrayal in England where they were not allowed to participate in the victory parade for fear of offending Stalin and the domestic Labor Party), and a summation of German losses during the campaign.  It is known that the war costs the Germans over fifty-thousand casualties and approximately twenty percent of their tanks.

From the very start of the war, the Germans embarked on a reign of terror, executing both Polish “intellectuals” including policemen, lawyers, doctors, priests, and teachers.  In the beginning theses individuals were primarily Polish but Jews were also targeted.  The key was to break the will of the Poles to resist, the view being that the Jews had no where to go and could be handled on a larger scale in time.

In the end, the nation which was the first to stand up to Nazi Germany and who stood by the Allies in spite of bad faith, was a loser in the Second World War. There were no victory parades, no awarding of honors but there was forty-four years more years of terror under the rule of Communism. Perhaps that is why Poland realizes the danger of Russia so much more clearly than the Western Europeans.  

This work is a good introduction to the campaign and basic reference book for anyone who wishes to understand the importance of the politics on both sides and a bird’s eye view of the battles. Moorhouse follows in the footsteps of his mentor, Norman Davies so we should see additional fine histories in the future.

Many years ago, just out of University my parents and I travelled to Spain.  We took a side trip to Morocco and joined a group which was sheparded around by a local Muslim guide, complete with robe and soft slippers that curled upward at the toes.  As we progressed, the guide pointed out mosques, libraries, beautiful plazas, etc. always noting that when they were built during the tenth or eleventh century, Europe was in a Dark Age.  After several such episodes, my father, always the diplomat raised his hand and asked the guide if the Muslims had done anything in the last thousand years.  There was much laughter and the guide stopped making references to Europe’s Dark Age.

My story about my father’s comment strikes at the very heart of the problem around Islam today; massive hurt feelings that a once proud and conquering force is today among the most backward in the world.  Many Muslims in the Middle East resent the failures of their leaders and governments since Islam was turned back in 1683 at the gates of Vienna.  A society which, when the first printing press was introduced into Ottoman territories in 1450 banned it as a tool of the devil, simply failed to move with the world as created by the Europeans.  Piece by piece, the Islamic world was picked apart and subjugated by the West and the feeling of anger and frustration grew until it was believed by even some of the educated that radicalism and terrorism was the only answer.  Instead of looking forward, the radicals looked backwards trying to lead the Muslim world bravely backward into the 8th century.

Ed Husain, a former radical Islamist who has rejected extremism and is now a noted fellow at several excellent Western think tanks.  He has an excellent understanding not only of Islamic history, but also a solid foundation in the beliefs of the various factions that exist within Islam today.  He carefully outlines the Sunni-Shi’a schism, what is Sharia, who is a Sufi, the foundations of Wahhabism as well as in depth discussions on the various views on women, sex, education, Jews, etc.  Overall, you can feel him objective about the factions within Islam and this book is an excellent primer on Islam.

As a former radical, he knows and understands the rationale of the radicals in their view of where Islam has gone wrong and what they believe justifies their actions.  His discussion on the difference between the Quran and supposed comments and guidelines from Mohammed is very interesting.  As Muslims believe that the Quran is sacred as created by Mohammed, they are a perfect way to live life.  The supposed saying and guidelines from Mohammed are open to interpretation; were they in fact made by Mohammed or by others many years after his life.  Are these saying supported by the Quran or in violation of the Quran?  According to Husain, such injunctions as the veiling of women, not allowing women to be highly educated, and the rules by the likes of ISIS come from these supposed comments and have no basis in the Quran.  Due however, to the low level of education of many Imams, arguments against the likes of ISIS are weak or not capable of convincing Muslims to move away from such practices.

The author loves Islam, but he also has a rather distorted history of Islam.  According to his view, the warriors of Islam spared women and children as they swept across the land, but if they did, it was only to save them for the slave market.  Or, he mentions that the natives of India converted to Islam because they loved Islamic poetry and not because literally tens of millions were slaughtered by various Islamic rulers.  Yet, aside from these examples of glossing over of history (there are others), the book remains an excellent one that Westerners would do well to read.  Unlike other books on Islam, he does offer concrete suggestions on what can be done to reverse the trend towards radicalism and to move Islam forward in the real world.  He pushes hard for the Islamic world to accept Israel and to see what can be done with education, unity and hard work.  Would the Islamic world be willing to learn from Israel?  Can the Arab countries put aside their tribalism and move against (especially in Saudi Arabia) against Wahhabism?  Would the West be willing to create a Marshall Plan for the Islamic world in conjunction with the oil rich Arab world who would contribute to the development of lands outside of their own?  If not, then the path away from radicalism will be longer and harder than necessary.

We seem to be living in a time when a goodly portion of humanity, the white portion, should be, according to many on the Left, walking around with ashes on our heads while we practice self-flagellation for the sins which our race has done to most of humanity. This is especially true of the ignorant and those who seek to make a name-and money, from this narrative. Unfortunately for them, there are those who question if these ignorant and self-righteous have any idea about what they are talking about. One such person is Nigel Biggar, the Regius Professor Emeritus of Moral and Pastoral Theology at the University of Oxford. His excellent book, Colonialism: A Moral Reckoning looks openly and honestly at the charges of those who claim that colonialism, specifically that practiced by the British Empire have a grounding in fact. He looks at various questions such as, what was the driving force behind the Empire? Was it greed? Was the Empire basically racist? Was the Empire violent in that it imposed terrible conditions on its colonial subjects?

Although not a professional historian-he holds a BA in Modern History from Oxford while his Ph.Ds. are in Christian Theology and Ethics in Christian Theology and Ethics from the University of Chicago, his knowledge and research is excellent and he brings a balanced view of history as he includes the ethical component which in this case adds more depth to the book.

He initially raises the question of the concept of colonialism in that colonialism is as old as humanity. The empires of the Assyrians over four thousand years ago practiced colonialism. They were followed by the Egyptians, Babylonians, and Persians. The Athenians, Romans, Muslims, Asantes, etc. all were colonial powers. Some brought value with their overlordship, some only brought suffering, so how and where did the British Empire stand in relationship to all those who had gone before them? How did they stand against their contemporaries, such as the French, Russians, Dutch, Moguls, etc.? The problem and challenge are to not only read those who attack colonialism, but to look at their research to see if their writings are based on facts.

One such example is a famous quote which is attributed to Cecil Rhodes, when he is reported to have said, “I prefer land to the n—ers..the natives are like children. They are just emerging from barbarism…one should kill as many n—ers as possible.”  A terrible statement, often quoted by eminent historians as an example of the mindset of the British Empire. There is a problem however, for there is no evidence that Rhodes ever made that statement. Much of the statement was written by a former Rhodes scholar who is a director of a major Pan-African university in Johannesburg while more of it was “made up from three different elements drawn from three different sources” including a novel. Hardly scholastic proof. In fact, Rhodes supported the franchise in the Cape Colony that gave blacks the vote on the same term as whites, he funded a black newspaper, and his scholarship was color-blind from the first. Such minor details escape those who use Rhodes as an example of the British mindset.

His book is chapter after chapter of not whitewash, but a review of the times, norms, attitudes, and actions of both the British and the people’s they ruled. He discusses the abuses of colonialism as well as the benefits which provided the locals to better their lives and futures. The Empire stopped abuses such as the burning of widows, instituted a legal system where for the first time, the poorest of the poor could confront those who had previously exercised power as they wished. More rail mileage was built in India than existed in Great Britain with the result that freedom of movement, increased trade and food was more readily available than before their arrival.

And yes, there were abuses. Most abuses came at the local level, by the soldiers, local traders, etc. rather than from the governors, magistrates, and administrators. He quotes the proclamation of governors and provides details on their actual achievements. Those governors who exercised a great deal of freedom in their area seldom abused the great power they had and there are instances quoted when the locals feared a return to the old days where power was used arbitrarily when the governors were withdrawn. There was racism in many instances, especially in India after the Sepoy Rebellion when old loyalties and trusts were torn apart.

Because the author has a background in ethics, he broaches the question of compensation, one which is heard as a drumbeat. On one hand, were the natives justly compensated for their goods and land? Did they suffer to a greater or lesser extent from racism? How many locals were killed when they demanded independence or during times of famine? On the other hand, what was the value of immunization against disease which saved millions of lives? What was the value of freedom from slavery as practiced by local rulers? What was the value of instituting an educational system and the values of that system which allowed the locals to be able to step into power once independence was achieved?

This book may not convince the rabid anti-colonialist that the British empire experience had any positive worth. The author did however achieve one of his goals in that any reader who approaches the subject with even an inkling of an open mind will realize that the pros and cons, the costs vs. benefits, of colonialism as practiced by the British require a serious weighing on the scales of if not justice, at least intellect.

There is certainly no shortages of histories and biographies of Stalin, one of the greatest mass murderers in history. His crimes, his murders were taken unlike his contemporary, Hitler, against for the most part, his own people. He did not have a policy of racial superiority or any underlying moral rationale for his crimes; his sole purpose was to achieve and maintain his power and in this, he is unique among the “big three” of mass murderers: Mao, Hitler, and Stalin.

Robert Conquest, perhaps the top historian of the Soviet Union has in this short book (just over three hundred pages), an excellent overview of Stalin’s drive, achievement, and maintenance of power. Although not as detailed as his other excellent histories which go deeper into the Stalin regime (The Harvest of Sorrow, The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Inside Stalin’s Secret Police: NKVD Politics 1936-39, etc.), Conquest along with Robert C. Tucker and Orlando Figes has provided a comprehensive analysis of the man and his times.

Conquest as always, manages to provide a certain analytical approach that can bring the reader up short: in this case, it is his comparison of the followers of Nazism and Communism. He quotes Hugh Seton-Watson’s comments that:

“Hitler’s Nazis were ‘fanatics with an ersatz religion,’ who rejected not only Christianity but also traditional morality as such. Nazism’s central feature was ‘moral nihilism’…. (it) is not only the central feature of National Socialism, but also the common factor between it and Bolshevism.” 

This statement is backed up by a review of leading Nazis, including Hitler, Goebbels, Mussolini, the dreaded Gauleiter of the Ukraine, Koch, and others who all started out as Socialist and ended up as either Fascists or Nazis. And it was not unusual after the war for die hard Nazi’s to reverse their coat and be taken into the Soviet camp. On one hand, the Nazis use race, the Communist used social origin as the determining factor for life or death; both were (are) based on “moral nihilism.”

Conquest is an outstanding historian, but for the amateur historian, his writing may be a bit too intellectual. He has a firm grounding in the Russian mindset and his analysis of Stalin’s legacy on modern day Russians is excellent. His works not only encompass history, as he has had published a collection of poetry, verse translation, fiction, and criticism so to read Conquest is to be exposed to a man of great intellect. A faster read but no less excellent Soviet historian is Orlando Figes brings a more human touch to his histories.

As one learns Conquest’s style, one is drawn increasingly to it and like a favorite composer, one eagerly looks forward to the next work of his that one shall read.

The logistics of war is a science often neglected.  A prime example of this was when Japan attacked the US, their soldiers went to war with 2 pounds of logistical support (supplies, shipping, etc.) while the US soldier had 4000 pounds to support him.  The result was a forgone conclusion and not even Japan’s best-case scenario (a negotiated truce where they could keep some of their gains) was possible.

     The advent of trains added new dimensions to war; suddenly campaigns could be supplied further from the homeland and war did not have to take a break during the winter when traditionally armies were broken up and dispersed widely in order to not totally plunder the land.  More men, more supplies could be moved to threatened points of conflict and the result was longer, bloodier wars.

     This book is a bit of a disappointment in that it does not fully portray the full scope of the impact of railroads.  There is an interesting discussion of A.J.P. Taylor’s thesis that railroad tables led to wars, but it is counter balanced by the strategic goals (in this case of Russia and France against Germany).  Other volumes have pointed out the huge logistical undertaking of war; while it is interesting to try to grasp that 11,000 trains were re-directed in a campaign, that number does not tell you of the freight involved.  How many meals, guns, coats, boots, etc. were moved and delivered to the right units at the right time?  Or, there is no real discussion of how the lack to railroads going in the right direction led to French armies being beaten during mobilization by the more strategically designed Prussian railway system.

     This is a good book for the novice, for someone who wants to get a very basic grasp of the impact of railways on war, but it will lead one to look for follow up volumes on the subject.

Hannah Arendt, the noted political theorist and philosopher was on the receiving end of her fellow Jewish intellectual’s fury when she coined the phrase,” banality of evil” to describe Adolf Eichman. The question was asked, “How could she use such a phrase to describe those who had been responsible for the murder of six-million Jews? Surely those men were monsters, outside the norm of humanity.”  Yet she did not make that statement in a vacuum, but rather after covering the trial of Adolf Eichmann for The New Yorker magazine. Friends and compatriots turned on her as she even dared to suggest that some Jews made the work of the Nazi’s easier by co-operating with the Nazis.

In The Good Old Days, we investigate the letters home, photo albus, confidential reports and diaries of those involved in mass murders. The title is drawn from a caption in a photo album belonging to the last commander of Treblinka. During its operation, it was visited by a professor of medicine who “was appalled” by what he saw, yet in his diary he notes the excellent food and “first-rate vanilla ice cream.”  This was only one of many references from the letters and diaries of others including ordinary policy battalions (there were about one hundred fifty such battalions). The police battalions contained ordinary police officers which were formed to “police” the rear areas of Eastern Front. Shipped to the East with no special training, they were  instructed to proceed with the murder of mostly Jews in the occupied territories. On the site they were instructed as to the types and depth of the trenches where the victims were led, the order of execution, and so forth. As time went on, the men became more proficient and were able to conduct the executions much more quickly.

How did the men of the police battalions react to their commanding officers’ instructions for their first mass killing? Most of the men went along with and followed the instructions although the commanders made it truly clear that if any individual felt they could not comply, there would be no serious repercussions. A few, very few accepted the offer and were normally given kitchen duties or placed in charge of the latrines. Those few might be subject to comments from the rest of the battalion and a few of the dissenters would eventually relent and join their comrades in the killing.

Throughout the book, one is aware of the banality of the men. They complained about their sore feet, wrote home about “items” they picked up while doing their duty, noted especially tasty food, and longed for the day when they could return to their police duties back home. Some felt that they were doing a great service to mankind, but few would qualify as sadistic in the sense that they took pride in taking clean shots in order to minimize the suffering of the killed. At the same time, the drivers of the gas vans were responsible for cleaning the vans of blood, feces, hair, etc. and seemed to have seen it as another necessary if dirty job.

If one is looking for some special glimpse into the psyche of mass murderers, one will be disappointed by this book. In fact, it goes a long way to confirm Hannah Arendt’s phrase and observation. After the war, out of the one hundred and fifty battalions (up to 75,000 men), only a handful were convicted of war crimes. Most members when back to their old jobs, to their old towns and lived ordinary lives. Reunions were well attended and in their own way, celebrated the good old days.