For years, Albert Seaton’s “Battle for Moscow” has been the gold standard for reviews of that famous and brutal battle. This work is a welcome addition to any library on the subject as it is lighter and raises several points which are worth examining. Michael Jones uses eyewitness accounts of actions to bring a personal touch which was missing from Seaton’s and thus the reader is drawn not so much by the technical aspect of the battle as by the personal.
Traditionally, Hitler’s decision to shift forces to the battle for Kiev as opposed to Moscow, has been viewed as one of his major errors. Jones points out however, that the German Generals were split on this decision, for several favored the shift and argued with their equals over the policy. Hitler looked at the decision from his macro view that Germany needed the economic wealth of the Ukraine in order to achieve victory, while some of the Generals, such as Guderian believed that the taking Moscow was of great advantage both from the military and political viewpoint. While it does appear that the Germans might have been able to reach Moscow, the battle for the city itself might have very well turned out to be an earlier version of Stalingrad. In short, could the exhausted German army have fought a street by street engagement with a determined Soviet defense and in the face of a brutal winter?
Hitler’s decision to stand and fight is given short shift and viewed by Jones as incorrect. Yet something had to be done as the General Staff suddenly seemed, when faced with a real challenge, to freeze. Their only answer to the crisis of the Soviet counter-offensive seemed to be one of continued retreat, to where and what line of resistance no one could determine. While Hitler’s policy was brutal, it did buy time for the Wehrmacht. It was only the arrival of General Model that a positive response to the Soviet offensive was found, that being mobile operations against the Soviet flanks which wore down the attackers. Although this tactic may seem obvious as it was part of armored doctrine, the more traditional German generals seemed unable to grasp it’s use. The firing of numerous generals by Hitler should be viewed as a house cleaning of those who failed their first real test.
Finally, the question of the Russian winter; how was it that German generals, many of whom fought in Russia during World War I did not prepare their troops and equipment for the cold? The Luftwaffe and Waffen-SS units were better prepared, but the Wehrmacht went into the Russian winter in summer uniforms and without adequate lubricants for their equipment. While both Hitler and the generals hoped that the Soviets could be defeated in eight to ten weeks, how did the generals propose to protect their troops who were to garrison the country. This again, was a major failure of the German General Staff .
In short, while the post-war memoirs of many German generals place the blame on Hitler, they shared in the German failure at many different levels.
Well done to Michael Jones for a fine contribution to this history.
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