When we think of WWII in the Pacific, we tend to think of the great naval battles which involved mighty navies in ship to ship gun duels and epic air battles over many thousands of miles of ocean. Yes, we remember some of the islands on which so much blood was shed, but for Americans, it seemed to be a great conflict between two great navies.
Yet, for most of the modern era of Japan, it was the Army and not the Navy which drove foreign and domestic policy. Yes, the Japanese navy did defeat the Russians in an epic sea battle, but it was in support of the Army’s struggle on the mainland of Asia. Later, it was the junior officers of the Army who participated in attempted coups and assassination against the civilian government and it was the Army which gradually came to dominate the entire governmental policy making structure. The Army was the driving force behind the war in Manchuria and China and their promises of and easy victory were shattered by the battles of Nomonhan against Soviet troops lead by General Zhukov and the huge expanse of mainland China. It was only with the end of the “Hundred Days” after Pearl Harbor that the Navy gradually began to dominate the war effort as it was fully realized that a negotiated peace with the United States was not possible. Suddenly, the Army was thrown into a theater of operations it was neither prepared nor trained for in another ad hoc adventure.
I say another “ad hoc adventure” because as with so much of the Army’s war effort, and indeed that of Japan, there was little if any strategic thinking in their actions. They constantly over estimated their strength, under estimated the strength of their enemies and failed to understand the fully technology of war. Yes, they could produce huge battle ships, but logistically, they could not supply them with fuel. Their tanks were effective against peasants in China but could not stand up to even the Sherman tanks and could not run due to a lack of fuel and spare parts let alone trained mechanics. The supply lines in China were too long and the Army lacked enough motor transport; even if they had enough motor transport, again the lack of fuel would have stopped them cold. It is a sad fact that whereas the U.S. military man went to war with 4000 pounds of logistical support, the Japanese military man had only 2 pounds. Whereas the average U.S. recruit gained 10-20 pounds and grew in height, the average Japanese officer cadet only gained 4 pounds and did not grow an inch.
This book could be an excellent business handbook for it shows everything one could do to lose a war; no strategic planning, lack of communication between partners (Army and Navy), lack of raw materials, lack of technology, poor training, low educational level, lack of self-initiative, etc. The only asset the military felt they had superior reserves of, was spirit. Harkening back to the samurai, it was believed that the superior Japanese spirit could overcome every material advantage possessed by the enemy. Yet, the Japanese were amazed at the fighting spirit and daring of the Americans. During the battle of Midway, the Japanese simply could not believe the almost suicidal rust of the American torpedo bomber squadrons and the naked fury they faced. In the end, even their vaunted spirit could not prevail and a war which the leadership knew they could not win, turned out to be a far greater disaster than they could have ever imagined.
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